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REPLAY
Mitchell N. Berman

Abstract
This paper explores a question of superficial triviality: when sports use
instant replay technology to review on-field calls, what standard of review should
they employ? The conventional view is that on-field calls should be entrenched
against reversal such that, if the reviewing official has any doubt about the
correctness of the initial call, he must let it stand even if he thinks it very probably
wrong. Indeed, in the wake of officiating debacles at last summer‟s FIFA World
Cup, commentators proposed not only that soccer employ instant replay, but also
that it follow the NFL in directing officials to overturn on-field calls only when
“indisputable visual evidence” (IVE) reveals that call to be mistaken. This essay
argues that common wisdom in favor of IVE overlooks important considerations
against entrenchment and likely rests upon mistaken premises, and it offers
several concrete proposals for reform.
A lengthy investigation into the optimal standard of review for instant
replay in sports might seem frivolous. But it serves a deeper ambition. We are in
the early years of sports‟ colonization by econometricians, as legal theorists
remain watching from the sidelines. That is unfortunate. Formal organized
sports are, in effect, legal systems, and legal theorists might find much both to
teach and to learn by paying closer attention to competitive athletics. In short,
legal theorists would benefit from a sustained engagement with what I have
termed, in previous work, “the jurisprudence of sport.”
As a case study in this nascent field, this essay reveals that the problem of
appellate review in sports is surprisingly rich and complex—implicating profound
questions concerning the relationships among desert, entitlement and justice; the
difference between mistake and error; and the contours of loss aversion and
omission bias, among other things. But it shows even more than that. The
jurisprudence of sport maintains that sporting practices and norms can teach
lessons for ordinary legal systems as surely as the other way around. Illustrating
that claim, this essay draws from football replay practices an argument to reform
the criminal trial system to accommodate two verdicts of acquittal, not one.

REPLAY
Mitchell N. Berman*

INTRODUCTION
By most accounts, the 2010 FIFA World Cup was a brilliant success for
the host nation. Ever since soccer‟s world governing body had awarded the 2010
tournament to South Africa, making it the first African nation to host the world‟s
largest sporting event, critics had worried that it would not be up to the task. As
late as 2006, influential soccer figures had talked openly about withdrawing the
tournament from South Africa over concerns that the stadiums would be
incomplete or substandard and that crime and violence would run unchecked.1 In
the event, those fears went unrealized. Praising the quality of the facilities, the
vigilance of the government, and the warmth of the people, FIFA President Sepp
Blatter gave South Africa a grade of 9 out of 10, or “summa cum laude.”2
If South Africans had reason to be proud of their accomplishments, fans
across the globe gave the five-week tournament decidedly low marks. One
common complaint focused on the vuvuzelas, a South African horn blown by fans
that reaches an ear-splitting 127 decibels and whose drone has been compared to
the mind-wracking buzzing of millions of angry bees. Even worse, though, was
the officiating, which fans and journalists around the world derided as “an
absolute joke.”3
Fans of the American squad best remember referee Koman Coulibaly‟s
never-explained disallowance of what likely would have been the Yanks‟ gamewinning goal against Serbia off a direct kick by Landon Donovan. But the
knockout round witnessed even bigger howlers. England, for example, was
denied an equalizer against Germany when referee Jorge Larrionda failed to see
*
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1
State on Standby to Help Host 2010 World Cup, THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 22, 2006,
available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/state-on-standby-to-help-host-2010-worldcup/story-e6frg7s6-1111112566130
2
2010 FIFA World Cup: South Africa Revels in Success, TAIPEI TIMES, Jul.14, 2010,
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/sport/archives/2010/07/14/2003477885.
3
Jack McCallum, Refereeing at the World Cup is a joke, and it‟s hurting image of the
game,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED,
June
28,
2010,
available
at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/jack_mccallum/06/28/world.cup/index.html.
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that a shot by Frank Lampard that hit the underside of the crossbar landed a full
two feet inside the goal. And Argentina took a 1-0 lead against Mexico on a goal
by Carlos Tevez scored after Tevez had been at least a yard offside.
Gross officiating errors like these—following on the heels of a gaffe
during qualifiers that allowed France to make it to South Africa on a blatant but
uncalled Thierry Henry handball—provoked worldwide calls for soccer to initiate
some form of replay. Public opinion on the question was so strong that even
Blatter, who, only two years earlier, had refused even to consider proposals to
employ technology to improve or review on-field officiating, felt compelled to
change his tune. After having apologized to England and Mexican officials for
the gross miscues in their matches, Blatter acknowledged that “we have to open
again this file, definitely.” “Something,” he conceded, “has to be changed.”4
Remarkably, just a week before opening ceremonies in Johannesburg,
Major League Baseball had been hit with an instant replay controversy of its own
when umpire Jim Joyce robbed Detroit Tigers hurler Armanda Galarraga of a
perfect game with a mistaken call at first base with two outs in the ninth inning.
The popular response was enormous, debate spilling over the sports pages and
even hitting page one of the New York Times. Just as his World Cup counterpart
would do later that same month, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig admitted that the
sport would have to reconsider whether to expand use of instant replay beyond
determining whether a ball hit over the fence was fair or foul.5
As technology advances, proposals to improve sports officiating by
technological means—from using instant replay to review calls made by officials,
to deploying electronic eyes that would displace initial human judgments—will
only gain steam. Stakeholders of every variety—fans, players, owners, coaches,
and broadcast partners—have already weighed in. But lawyers and law professors
have not been particularly vocal or visible contributors to the debates.6 This essay
aims to rectify that imbalance.
I have argued elsewhere that formal organized sports systems have much
more in common with ordinary legal systems than is generally appreciated and,
therefore, that legal theorists might find much both to learn and to teach by paying

4

Graham Dunbar, Bad Calls Prompt FIFA to Consider New Technology, ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
Jun.
29,
2010,
available
at
http://www.salon.com/sports/feature/2010/06/29/world_cup_bad_calls_technology.
5
Jerry Crasnik, Selig Doubts Replay Use Will be Expanded, ESPN, Jun. 8, 2010,
available at http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=5262731. He also predicted that
nothing would be changed.
6
But see infra note 26.
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closer attention to the world of sports. 7 Like legal systems, organized sports
systems—by which I mean, to a first approximation, sports that feature written
rules, rulemakers, and (at least at some levels of play) rule-enforcing officials—
seek to facilitate and regulate behavior principally by means of general rules laid
down in advance, rather than by individualized directives. That much is obvious.
But congruence between the two domains run broader and deeper than is usually
appreciated.
Like ordinary lawmakers, gamewrights confront virtually the entire
panoply of problematics that traditionally engage legal theorists: when to regulate
behavior “directly,” by means of formal written norms or “indirectly,” by refining
and strengthening informal social norms; how best to navigate tradeoffs between
rules and standards; when to delegate discretion to enforcement authorities, and
how best to constrain it; how to respond to the problem of epistemic uncertainty;
how to conceptualize, deter, and sanction “cheating”; how to identify and rectify
the gaps that inevitably arise between “the law in the books” and “the law in
action”; when to tolerate ties and how to resolve them when they should not be
tolerated; how to analyze and craft optimal sanctions; and much more. Given the
great many similarities in the challenges that sports and law confront and the tools
at their disposal, sports would richly repay more systematic attention from legal
theorists and comparative lawyers. In recent years, econometricians have
increasingly turned the powerful analytical tools of their discipline on sports.8 It
is past time for jurisprudes to follow suit.
The use of instant replay technology to review and possibly overturn calls
made by officials on the field of play is one possible component of a system of
appellate review of decisionmaking. It is therefore a natural subject of study for
7

See Mitchell N. Berman, “Let „em Play”: A Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport, 99
Geo. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2011) (examining whether, and under what circumstances, rules of
sports should be enforced less strictly at crunch time). This is not to claim that jurisprudes have
ignored sports (and games) entirely, but only that the attention paid to this domain—including by
such giants as Hart and Dworkin—is occasional and ad hoc. See, e.g., HLA HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 89 (2d ed. 1994); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW‟S EMPIRE 136-38 (1986). The best known
precursors in the law reviews to serious jurisprudential or comparative engagement with both
sports and law are more whimsical than probing. See, for the best of breed, Aside, The Common
Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474 (1975).
8
See, e.g., TOBIAS MOSKOWITZ & L. JON WERTHEIM, SCORECASTING: THE HIDDEN
INFLUENCES BEHIND HOW SPORTS ARE PLAYED AND GAMES ARE WON (2011) (exploring, among
other questions, the magnitude and causes of home-field advantage, and whether teams and
players really ever are “in the zone”); Joseph Price and Justin Wolfers, Racial Discrimination
Among NBA Referees, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Oct.-Dec. 2010, at 1859-1887 (using
econometrics to assess racial discrimination by NBA referees); Ignacio Palacios-Huerta,
Professionals Play Minimax, REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, Apr. 2003, at 395-415 (testing the
Minimax theorem using data from penalty shoot-outs in soccer).
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students of the domain of inquiry that we may denominate the jurisprudence of
sport.
***
Although newcomers to the debates over instant replay might suppose that
the issue presents a single question—whether to employ instant replay or not—it
is helpful to distinguish at least three sets of questions: (1) What calls should be
reviewable?; (2) what should be the procedures be for implementing review?; and
(3) what should be the standard of review?
Particularistic answers to the first question must be sport-specific simply
because each sport has its own rules and therefore its own calls (pass interference,
strike, offside, traveling, leg before wicket, etc.). But necessarily sport-specific
particularistic answers might possibly follow from a more general solution that
could apply across sports—for example, from a principle that all and only the
“game-changing calls” should be reviewable, or that review should be available
for all except the “judgment calls.” General solutions like these are conceivable,
but do not seem promising on reflection—partly because the categories of “gamechanging calls” and “judgment calls” might not withstand scrutiny, 9 and partly

9

It is difficult to separate types of calls into those that are and are not “game-changing”
because a particular instance of a call-type that does not usually substantially influence the game‟s
outcome might be momentous on that occasion. Imposition of a modest five-yard penalty for
delay of game or illegal procedure, for example, might push the offense out of field goal position.
Moreover, whether it does might be known only to the kicker and his coach, which is why critics
have objected to the NCAA rules that allow booth review only when, among other things, the call
at issue would have—in the replay official‟s estimation— “a direct, competitive impact on the
game.”
The distinction between “judgment calls” and “non-judgment calls” might appear more
promising. Indeed, although the NFL rules specifically enumerate the reviewable calls, many
commentators have described—and endorsed—the classificatory principle at work in these more
general terms. The argument runs like this: Even if we should try harder to get calls right when
there is a true fact of the matter to discover (like whether the ball hit the ground or crossed the
plane of the end zone), there just aren‟t simple truths about matters of evaluative judgment (like
whether some amount of contact was excessive), so subjecting such calls to reply review would
amount to substituting one official‟s judgment for that of another. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather &
Matthew M. Fernholz, Comparative Procedure on a Sunday Afternoon: Instant Replay in the NFL
as a Process of Appellate Review, 43 Ind. L. Rev. 45, 51-52 (2009).
But matters are not quite so neat. Most importantly, many unreviewable “judgment
calls” involve elements that are purely factual. Take the most significant of the unreviewable
calls: pass interference. How much contact is necessary to constitute forbidden interference might
well be a matter of judgment and not properly reviewed. But what if replay shows that there was
no contact at all, that the receiver tripped over his own feet? A mistaken defensive pass
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because, even to the extent that categories like these are coherent, the costs and
benefits of review are likely to vary across sports to such a degree as to render
one-size-fits-all solutions suboptimal. To focus on just one consideration, any
review consumes some amount of time, and sports vary in their tolerance for
delay—soccer, for example, prides itself on the continuity of its play, whereas
cricket matches are cheerfully interrupted for tea. So it seems likely that some
sports will find it desirable to review even some calls that aren‟t game-changers,
and other sports will reasonably prefer not to review even some calls that are
thought not to require application of an official‟s (subjective) “judgment.” Much
the same reasoning would apply to the second question too: procedures for
instituting review on a given occasion must be sensitive to variations among
sports on matters relevant to instant replay process.
Even if answers to the first two questions vary from sport to sport, many
people seem to think that the answer to the third is fairly general—not necessarily
that there is one optimal review standard for all sports that institute instant replay,
but that there is one right answer for many. The conventional view is that on-field
calls should be entrenched against reversal such that they may be overturned only
when the replay evidence is “indisputable” (in the language of the NFL, NCAA
football, and the CFL) or “conclusive” (e.g., NBA and Test cricket). Put another
way, it is standardly accepted that if the reviewing official has any doubt as to the
correctness of the initial call, he should be instructed to let it stand—even if he
considers it very probably wrong.
Precisely because the “indisputable visual evidence” (IVE) standard is
widely embraced as the appropriate standard of review across disparate sports,10
interference call in such circumstances seems like just the sort of thing that review is well suited
for.
Just as interestingly, reviewable calls can contain unnoticed elements of judgment.
Consider a potentially game-altering play in the Giants‟ 38-45 loss to the Eagles in Week 14 of the
2009 season. After scrambling for a 15-yard gain to escape a sack, Giants QB Eli Manning fell to
the ground and lost the football. The Eagles recovered and were awarded possession. Calls of
fumble and change of possession are reviewable to determine whether the ball carrier was down
by contact before losing control of the ball, and the Giants challenged. Replay showed
indisputably that Manning‟s knee was down before he lost the ball. So ordinarily the call would
be reversed. But while it was clear that Manning was down, it wasn‟t as clear that he was down by
contact: Eagles‟ defensive tackle Brodrick Bunkley had grabbed a piece of Manning‟s jersey as he
escaped the pocket, but Manning took a few steps before hitting the turf, making it unclear
whether the defensive contact had caused Manning‟s contact with the ground. If it had, there was
no fumble; if it hadn‟t, there was. In the event, referee John Parry upheld the call on the field, but
neither he nor the broadcast announcers suggested that this was a judgment call, hence not
reviewable.
10
See e.g., Gabrielle Marcotti, Further Review on Instant Replay, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Sept.
25,
2008,
available
at
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that is the focus of this essay. Concentrating on football, I will argue that
conventional wisdom in favor of IVE likely rests upon mistaken premises, and
that settled practices should probably be changed. The analysis unfolds over four
parts.
Part I presents a brief history of instant replay review in the NFL. Part II
introduces the prima facie case in favor of a less demanding standard than IVE. It
is straightforward. Because the reason to institute instant replay review in the first
place is to correct officiating errors, the various features of the replay system—
including the standard of review—should be designed to minimize final errors.
Drawing widely from actual experience with the standard in professional football
and from longstanding practices in the law, it argues that a standard, like IVE, that
entrenches the initial call does not serve this interest, and that the goal of errorcorrection would be better served by employing a less demanding standard, such
as de novo review.
Of course, minimizing officiating errors cannot be the only criterion by
which to evaluate standards of review: even if a de novo standard of review would
yield fewer final errors than does IVE, it might nonetheless be suboptimal if it
proved too costly in other respects. Accordingly, Part III isolates and assesses
possible counterarguments to the basic case against IVE presented in Part II. It
finds unpersuasive the most prominent arguments against a less stringent standard
of review—that such a standard would intolerably increase reviewing delays or
would unduly threaten respect for the officials. However it also identifies other
reasons to disfavor de novo review—reasons not already well developed in the
literature—that are likely to resonate with some readers. It concludes, therefore,
that no standard of review for the use of instant replay in football obviously
dominates the alternatives given reasonably divergent empirical assumptions and
evaluative judgments.
Fortunately, the ambivalence of its conclusion
notwithstanding, the disparate analyses of Part III allow for a much clearer-eyed
assessment of the status quo, and of alternative proposals for the use of instant
replay review, than was possible previously. Part IV makes good on this claim by
presenting three novel proposals for revising the football replay system to
accommodate the different perspectives on the value and costs of error-correction
that emerge from Part III.
Because this (partial) roadmap might convey the impression that the trip
ahead will be of interest (at most) only to readers who are glued to their sets every
Sunday in the fall, I should assure you that it is not quite so parochial. First,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/gabriele_marcotti/09/25/replay/ (arguing that soccer
should institute instant replay and that the appropriate standard of review is “simple. Just adopt
the NFL language.”).
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although the express focus throughout will be on American football to keep things
manageable, the argument will draw occasionally from practices in other sports,
baseball most particularly. And just as the discussion will sometimes draw from
other sports, so too will it bear lessons for them: implications for all sports that
presently use, or contemplate introducing, instant replay will rarely lie very far
below the surface. Second, we cannot accomplish the narrow goals specified
without investigating some issues whose philosophical or jurisprudential
relevance will be apparent even to readers uninterested in sports. 11 Trying to
figure out the optimal standard of review for instant replay in football will require
that we confront difficult questions on such disparate matters as the relevance of
both desert and entitlement to justice, the possible difference between mistakes
and errors, and the likely shape and strength of varieties of cognitive bias.
Furthermore and finally, while the first four parts of the essay are
principally in service of the idea that law has something to teach sports, law and
lawyers don‟t have all the wisdom. The jurisprudence of sport, after all, is
predicated on the belief that sporting practices and norms can teach lessons for
ordinary legal systems just as surely as the other way around. Part V illustrates
this proposition by drawing from replay practices in professional and collegiate
football reason to believe that the Anglo-American criminal trial system might be
profitably reformed to accommodate three verdicts, not two.
I. UNDER REVIEW: VIDEO REPLAY IN THE NFL
Riding Terry Bradshaw‟s arm and their fearsome Steel Curtain defense,
the Pittsburgh Steelers defeated the overmatched Los Angeles Rams 31-19 in
Super Bowl XIV to win an unprecedented fourth championship. Yet some
observers (especially on the Gulf Coast) thought that the Steelers‟ victory was
tainted. Two weeks earlier, they had beaten the Houston Oilers in the 1980 AFC
Championship Game by the seemingly lopsided score of 27-13. But the final
score was misleading. With the Steelers up 17-10 in the closing seconds of the
third quarter, Oiler quarterback Dan Pastorini hit Mike Renfro in the back of the
end zone. Although Renfro appeared to have control of the ball with both feet in
bounds before tumbling out of the end zone, officials ruled the pass incomplete
and the Oilers had to settle for a field goal. The Steelers scored 10 unanswered
points in the fourth quarter to clinch the victory and a trip to Pasadena. Television
replays at the time, however, showed, clearly enough to most viewers at home,
that Renfro had control before he fell out of bounds. It should have been a
touchdown.
11

You might think me overly optimistic in anticipating that anyone uninterested in sport
would have read far enough to reach this footnote. However even legal theorists have mothers.
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The “Mike Renfro Game” had legs. Six years later, NFL owners cited it
and other miscalls when voting to introduce a system of instant replay review for
the 1986 season.12 Under the inaugural system, review was entirely in the hands
of a single replay official sitting in a booth who, armed only with the broadcast
feeds and two VCRs, had sole authority to review a limited range of calls, mostly
relating to possession (like fumbles and receptions) and boundaries (the sidelines
and goal lines). A call could be reversed only if the evidence that it was incorrect
was “indisputable.”
This was hardly a streamlined system, and it predictably produced lengthy
delays. By 1991, replay officials reviewed over a thousand calls at an average of
over three minutes each, adding nearly 15 minutes to each game. 13 Moreover, the
NFL acknowledged that fully 13% of the reversals were mistaken. 14 In 1992, the
owners voted to eliminate video replay.
If the abandonment of that initial system was unsurprising, its eventual
return was even less so. There were murmurings, for example, when the Buffalo
Bills lost a 1996 playoff game to the Jaguars, after the Jaguars recovered a fourthquarter Jim Kelly fumble and drove for the winning field goal, while television
replays revealed that Kelly had been down by contact before losing the ball. But
discontent reached a boiling point two years later.
In week 13 of the 1998 season, the Bills were again victimized by a bad
call in a 25-21 loss at New England, as the Patriots‟ game-winning, time-expired
touchdown came two plays after Patriot receiver Shawn Jefferson, clearly out of
bounds, was credited with a reception for a first down on a desperation fourthdown pass. And the next week, the Seahawks lost to the New York Jets, when,
with seconds remaining, quarterback Vinny Testaverde snuck in on fourth and
goal from the Seattle 1 to give the Jets a thrilling 32-31 victory. Problem was, the
Seattle defense had clearly stopped Testaverde a good yard from the goal line.
That “phantom touchdown” cost Seattle a playoff berth and Coach Dennis
Erickson his job. Then, in the first round of those playoffs, the 49ers knocked off
the visiting Packers 30-27, thanks in part to the referees‟ failure to call a Jerry
Rice fumble on the winning drive.
Responding to season-affecting mistakes such as these, the owners voted
overwhelmingly to reintroduce a new instant replay system on a trial basis to start
in 1999. Rich McKay, general manager of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and co12

What If the NFL Had Not Employed Instant Replay, ESPN, Feb. 13, 2007, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2764251.
13
Lonnie White, Instant Replay—Football: NFL Gives It a Second Look, and Tagliabue
Says New Computerized System Is Huge Improvement Over Version Used in the Late „80s,
L.A.TIMES, Sept. 12, 1999.
14
Id. (noting that 12 of 90 reversed calls were mistaken).
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chairman of the NFL competition committee, explained the league‟s reasoning
succinctly: “we want to get the play right.”15 As the NFL‟s Senior Vice President
for Broadcasting, Val Pinchbeck, elaborated, the league doesn‟t “want anyone not
going to the Super Bowl because of an error that could be corrected.”16
That trial system, occasionally modified, was made permanent in 2007. It
differs from the system that the league had employed from 1986 through 1991 in
several respects. First, it provides that many more calls would be reviewable—a
list that the league has periodically expanded.17 Second, except in the final two
minutes of each half, replay is initiated, not by a replay official, but by the head
coaches who are permitted two challenges per game, and a third if each of the first
two is successful. An unsuccessful challenge costs the challenging team a
timeout. Third, the review itself is conducted, not by a booth official, but by the
referee who is given access to feeds from all stadium cameras, but is permitted to
view the video for only one minute.
One critical feature of the system has not changed over these many years:
the standard of review. The rules on this point are very clear: “A decision will be
reversed only when the Referee has indisputable visual evidence available to him
that warrants the change.”18
II. THE NUTSHELL CASE AGAINST IVE
The goal of instant replay is to correct officiating errors—or at least those
errors that are both correctible at reasonable cost, and consequential. Because
form should follow function, the instant replay system should be designed to
minimize (consequential) officiating errors. More precisely, the various features
of the system—including the standard of review—should be chosen to maximize
error correction up to the point at which the marginal cost exceeds the marginal
15

Thomas George, N.F.L. Backs Limited Replay After Complaints of Bad Calls, N.Y,
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1999, at A1.
16
Charean Williams, Play it Again: The NFL‟s Instant Replay Isn‟t Always the Last
Word, ORLANDO SENTINEL (1999).
17
Reviewable calls include: all those related to whether a player or ball did or did not
cross a goal line or side line; whether a pass was completed or intercepted; whether a pass was
touched by an ineligible receiver or by a defender, and whether it was thrown beyond the line of
scrimmage; whether a ball carrier was down by contact before losing control of the ball; whether a
kick attempt was good, when not higher than the top of the uprights as it crossed the goal post;
whether there were too many players on the field; and the spotting of the ball when a correct spot
might determine whether the offense is awarded a first down. NFL Rules, Rule 15, § 9. The list
of unreviewable calls is much longer. Some of the more common and consequential include
offside, holding, pass interference, unsportsmanlike conduct, status of the clock, forward progress
not relating to touchdowns or first downs, and recovery of a loose ball in the field of play.
18
NFL Rule 15 Section 9.
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benefits. Call this the Pinchbeck Principle. Stripped to its essentials, the
argument against IVE is that it does not satisfy this desideratum, and that a more
relaxed standard of review—something like the law‟s de novo standard of
review—would.
A. The Heart of the Argument
“Indisputable visual evidence” is an extraordinarily stringent standard—on
its face, more demanding than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof
that governs criminal trials. The intended consequence is to drastically minimize
the number of times a correct initial call is reversed. A second consequence—not
intended, but surely foreseeable—is to ensure that a large number of mistaken
initial calls are permitted to stand uncorrected. Put another way, if the standard is
complied with, correct on-field calls will be overturned very rarely. That‟s good.
But incorrect on-field calls will be allowed to stand very frequently. That‟s bad.
From an error-minimization standpoint, the only question is which effect is
greater relative to a more neutral or less deferential standard of review: the
reduction in erroneous reversals or the increase in erroneous affirmances?
Surely, however, this is not a difficult question. On the assumption that
reviewing officials‟ beliefs track reality tolerably well—or, more precisely, that
they are not systematically biased in one direction or the other 19 —the league
would minimize the combination of erroneous final calls by instructing each
official to announce the ruling that he believes is more likely than not correct.
Error minimization, after all, is precisely the rationale behind the law‟s
preponderance of the evidence—or “more likely than not”—standard of proof.20
19

This is a critical assumption that, although generally reasonable, isn‟t always.
Consider three-card monte. What makes this con successful is that the mark‟s beliefs are poor
guides to truth. If you‟re looking for, say, the red ace, you might do better not picking the card in
which you have most confidence. The possibility of similar and systematic mismatch between
facts and beliefs is something a legal system should take into account. For example, controlled
experiments repeatedly demonstrate that people place vastly too much credence in eyewitness
testimony—a proposition that the large number of cases of DNA exoneration vividly bolster. So
when only one party to a lawsuit introduces such testimony, factfinders are likely to be more
confident in that party‟s case than is warranted. Or suppose that jurors systematically overweight
the testimony of police officers. If so, then use of the preponderance standard in criminal trials
might produce more false positives than would an epistemically unbiased factfinder. A standard
of proof greater than preponderance could help counter this bias, and actually increase total
accuracy. Unsystematic biases—biases that sometimes favor one party, sometimes the other—
might wash out in the long run. But when a legal system is infected by recurring and nonrandom
biases, then the more-likely-than-not standard of proof might not minimize total errors relative to a
heightened (or lowered) standard designed to offset the bias.
20
See, e.g., DH Kaye, The Error of Equal Error Rates, 1 Law, Prob. & Risk 3 (2002)
(discussing and criticizing the competing hypothesis that preponderance of the evidence equally
allocates errors).
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Much as unbiased jurors will, in the aggregate, minimize the sum of false
negatives and false positives by announcing verdicts in accordance with the facts
they believe more likely than not correct, so too would replay officials minimize
the sum of erroneous affirmances and erroneous reversals by announcing the
rulings in which they have the greater confidence. If, as would appear, replay
officials have good access to the facts, strongly deferential review all but ensures
more errors than necessary.
B. The Saints Go Marching In (An Illustration)
The 2010 NFC Championship Game came down to this: a 40-yard field
goal attempt by Saints‟ kicker, Garrett Hartley, less than five minutes into
overtime. A successful try would earn New Orleans a trip to Miami for the firstever Super Bowl in the „Aints lackluster 43-year history; a miss would give the
visiting Minnesota Vikings possession at their own 30-yard line and another
chance to break the hearts of the Saints‟ long-suffering fans. Minnesota called
time to ice the third-year kicker, but Hartley was unnerved, splitting the uprights
for a thrilling 31-28 Saints‟ victory and a date against the favored AFC Champion
Indianapolis Colts, whom they would defeat two weeks later.
Although the contest had seen more than its fair share of big plays and
controversial calls, the game-winning drive was unusually event-filled, with four
close and questionable rulings occurring over an extraordinary span of just five
plays.21 Three of the calls, all in the Saints‟ favor, were particularly close: a firstdown call on a fourth-and-one leap over the pile by Saints‟ running back Pierre
Thomas; a dubious pass interference call against Minnesota linebacker Ben Leber
that gave the Saints a twelve-yard gain; and a reception by wideout Robert
Meachem—for another twelve-yard pick up—on a low Drew Brees delivery over
the middle.
By rule, the pass interference call was unreviewable, but replay officials
did review the Thomas first down and the Meachem reception, eventually
upholding both close calls for want of the “indisputable visual evidence” required
for reversal. Meachem‟s reception was an especially bitter pill for Vikings fans,
for the ball clearly did hit the ground. Possibly, Mechem maintained possession,
but most observers didn‟t think so. The consensus was that the call on the field
21

The game‟s conclusion was noteworthy for another reason too. It prompted the NFL to
change its overtime rules to reduce the influence of luck in calling the coin toss by providing that a
team cannot win a playoff game in overtime just by scoring a field goal on the first overtime
possession. See generally David Fleming, The Making of NFL Rule 16, ESPN The Magazine,
Dec. 27, 2010, at 74. The new rule provides that “If the team that possesses the ball first scores a
field goal on its initial possession, the other team (Team A) shall have the opportunity to possess
the ball. If Team A scores a touchdown on its possession it is the winner. If the score is tied after
Team A‟s possession, the team next scoring by any method shall be the winner.” NFL Rule 16.
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was mistaken: should not have been ruled a catch. For example, under the
headline, “Did Officials Bungle the End Game for Vikings?” the New York Times
sports blog observed that “Meachem bobbled a catch as he fell to the ground at
the Vikings‟ 22. The ball appeared to hit the ground and move.”22
But if, as dominant opinion would have it, the call on the field was
mistaken, most commentators believe that referee Pete Morelli‟s refusal to
overturn the call was correct too. Analysts at NBC Sports “agreed with the
decision. Though it appears that the call was wrong, the „100 drunks in a bar‟
standard requires clear evidence to overturn the real-time ruling. And clear
evidence was not available.” 23 NFL VP of officiating, Mike Pereira, made
precisely that point when acknowledging that the call could have gone either way
while insisting that the refusal to overturn the call was, therefore, necessarily
correct. Under league rules, he explained, referees are not to overturn on-field
calls “unless [they] had 150% concrete visual evidence that there was no doubt in
anyone‟s mind” that the call was mistaken.24
Notice, then, that replay permitted this call to be reviewed; the call was
probably mistaken; and IVE prevented it from being corrected. So, we might
reasonably ask: Was it a consequential mistake? What would have happened had
this apparent mistake been corrected?
Of course, that‟s impossible to answer for sure. But we can reason
through some probabilities. If the referee had ruled, after review, that Meachem
had not retained possession, New Orleans would have faced third and fifteen at
the Minnesota 34. The Saints had converted only 3 of 12 third downs the entire
game, and their chances at that distance would have been dim.25 So the likelihood
is that (had this probably-mistaken call been corrected) Saints coach Sean Payton
would soon have faced a difficult choice: go for it on fourth down, attempt a field
goal, or punt. No doubt his choice among these options would have been affected
22

Did Officials Bungle the End Game for Vikings? N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, available
at http://fifthdown.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/did-officials-bungle-the-end-game-for-vikings/.
23
Gregg Rosenthal, Pereira Talks About Controversial Calls in Saints-Vikings Overtime,
ProFootballTalk.com,
Jan.
27,
2010,
available
at
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/01/27/pereira-talks-about-controversial-calls-in-saintsvikings-overtime/.
24
Championship Playoffs Official Review Bonus Coverage (video), NFL.com, Jan. 27,
2010 available at http://www.nfl.com/videos/nfl-playoffs/09000d5d816037d3/ChampionshipPlayoffs-official-review-bonus-coverage
25
Over the course of the 2009 season, offenses facing third down and at least 8 yards to
go had converted just under 24% of the time. Inside 3rd Down Run v. Pass Success, Stampede
Blue, Jun. 24, 2010, available at http://www.stampedeblue.com/2010/6/24/1533609/inside-3rddown-run-vs-pass. I haven‟t calculated the conversion percentage for third and fifteen, but we can
bet that it was noticeably lower.
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by how many yards, if any, New Orleans had gained on third down. But neither
of the first two options promised great hope for success: an incompletion on third,
for example, would have left Hartley with a 51-yard field goal attempt, well
beyond his career long.
So the chances are good that, one way or another, the ball would have
been delivered once more into the hands of the powerful Minnesota offense led by
Brett Favre—the 2009 miracle man who, in his first season in purple and gold
was coming off perhaps the best season of his 19-year Hall of Fame career, not
the 2010 version who appeared to be auditioning for the Walking Dead. And had
Favre again seen the ball, Vikings fans would have had reason for optimism.
Their high-octane offense had already shredded the Saints‟ D for 475 yards, and
their kicker, the 13-year veteran Ryan Longwell, had been money all season long:
his 92.9% field-goal completion percentage—including two for two at fifty yards
and beyond—was second best in the league.
In short, the reception call was probably mistaken, it was correctly upheld
under the governing IVE standard but probably should and would have been
overturned under de novo review, and the mistake might well have made the
difference for the Vikings between going home and going to Miami. To repeat,
we can‟t know for sure what would have happened had this probably mistaken
call been reversed—whether the Vikings would have gained possession again
and, if so, what they would have done with it. But the thought that it might have
made all the difference is no mere fantasy. Recall the rationale for employing
instant replay in the first place: to ensure, to the best of the league‟s ability, that
no team doesn‟t go “to the Super Bowl because of an error that could be
corrected.” If so, then the 2010 NFC Championship game suggests that the
standard of review is ill-chosen: it should be de novo, not IVE.
C. Summary
Epistemic standards that provide that an initial call cannot be corrected
after instant replay review unless the reviewing official deems the evidence of
error “indisputable” or “conclusive” strongly entrench initial calls against
reversal. The argument against strong entrenchment—and, equivalently, the
argument in favor of something like de novo review—can be parsed as follows:
1. The NFL should employ that standard of review that would maximize
the correction of consequential errors except insofar as correcting the marginal
error is outweighed by marginal costs of the system. (The Pinchbeck Principle)
2. De novo review corrects more (consequential) errors than does IVE.
(The error-minimization premise)
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3. De novo review does not incur more costs than IVE—or not enough to
outweigh the increased benefits in the coin of error correction. (The notprohibitively-costly premise)
4. Therefore, de novo review is preferable to IVE.
III. IN DEFENSE OF IVE
I am aware of no systematic defense of the IVE standard. To my
knowledge, the NFL itself has never publicly explained the reasoning behind its
choice of standard, and because the puzzle has received so little attention from
fans and commentators, it is hard to be sure of all that might be said in its favor.
That said, I have seen only a handful of arguments in favor of the IVE standard.
And most, unfortunately, are blog posts. 26 Some of these arguments are
implausible on their face;27 others are frustratingly enigmatic.28 My goal in this
26

Toward the end of 2009, Duke law professor Joseph Blocher (responding to an article
that had discussed the IVE standard approvingly, Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 9) questioned
the NFL‟s IVE standard of review in a post to Prawfsblawg. Joseph Blocher, Why Aren‟t Instant
Replays
Reviewed
De
Novo,
PrawfsBlog,
Dec.
1,
2009,
available
at
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/12/why-arent-instant-replays-reviewed-denovo.html. That post was picked up by several other bloggers, including George Mason‟s Ilya
Somin. Illya Somin, Why Instant Replay Should Be Like De Novo Appellate Review, The Volokh
Conspiracy, Dec. 2, 2009, available at http://volokh.com/2009/12/02/why-instant-replay-shouldbe-like-de-novo-appellate-review/. Having already completed a draft of this chapter, I wrote a
short piece for Slate extending Blocher‟s and Somin‟s arguments. Mitchell Berman, After Further
Review, Slate, Dec. 22, 2009, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2239018/. These postings, and
others, provoked a large number of rejoinders. I will be quoting from some of those comments.
Blocher was not the first to recommend that the NFL adopt a less demanding standard of
review. Nearly a decade earlier, a short piece appeared in the Vermont Law Review proposing that
“manifest weight of the evidence” would be a preferable standard. Jack Achiezer Guggenheim,
Blowing the Whistle on the NFL‟s New Instant Replay Rule: Indisputable Visual Evidence and a
Recommended “Appellate” Model, 24 Vt. L. Rev. 567 (2000). That analysis, however, was
almost entirely based on a peculiar premise. Observing that, midway through the 1999 season,
nearly 30 percent of challenged calls had been reversed, Guggenheim concluded that the
reviewing referees must be applying something less stringent than IVE in practice. Yet, he further
noted, league executives expressed satisfaction with the system, so they must want a 30% reversal
rate. The “manifest weight of the evidence” standard, he concluded, would capture existing, and
seemingly desired, practice more faithfully than does the IVE. Id. at 569-71. The fly in the
ointment, though, is Guggenheim‟s assumption that the bare reversal rate can tell us anything at all
about the standard of review being applied. That the referees were not applying the IVE standard
would have been a sensible inference if the calls they had been reversing at a 30% clip had been
selected at random, but not if, as was the case, the reviewed calls were selected from a vastly
larger pool by coaches and replay officials who knew what the applicable standard would be.
27
See,
e.g.,
Posting
of
bsharporflat
to
Slate,
http://fray.slate.com/discuss/forums/thread/3534251.aspx?ArticleID=2239018 (contending that
“the essence of sports spectatorship demands that the referee‟s onfield decision take precedence
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Part is to disambiguate the arguments for IVE and to carefully assess them. This
will require some sympathetic reconstruction. It will also demand more
argumentative care than “serious” people are usually inclined to devote to the
subject.29 Indeed, some readers will likely find my efforts here perverse on the
grounds that football is, after all, “only a game.”
But, of course, my campaign for a rigorous jurisprudence of sport is
predicated on a contrary assumption—namely, that sport warrants and repays
exacting analysis. This is partly because sports present intellectual problems that
are intrinsically interesting and challenging, and partly because those problems
are often structurally analogous, sometimes structurally identical, to problems that
arise in domains of life of greater intrinsic importance. So solutions in this
humble domain will often bear fruit for loftier realms as well. In this way, and
much like the space program, the jurisprudence of sport promises positive
spillover effects.
All sound arguments for IVE should be formulable as challenges to one or
another step in the argument for de novo review. Because the conclusion seems
clearly to follow from the premises, the objections can be grouped as challenges
to one or another of the first three premises. Section III.A considers a challenge
to premise 2—i.e., that the IVE results in more total mistaken calls than would a
lower standard of review. On this competing view, there is no need to engage in
the careful and contestable balancing of pros and cons that premise 3 aims to
capture because the key consideration that I have claimed to weigh against the
NFL‟s chosen standard is simply fallacious. This argument, I conclude, is
meritless. Two additional arguments acknowledge that the IVE produces more
total errors than would a lower standard but identify countervailing considerations
that, their proponents believe, justify the more demanding standard all things
considered: that the IVE is reasonably necessary to reduce the delay that use of
replay technology introduces; and that the IVE protects against corrupt officials.
over a video-shows-most-likely-correct decision”). Non-deferential review might be a bad idea,
but the notion that it would flout essential demands of sports spectatorship is hard to take
seriously.
28
See,
e.g.,
Posting
of
Allen
to
Prawfsblawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/12/why-arent-instant-replays-reviewed-denovo.html#comments. (“To me the current system makes sense. Deferential review because there
are instances where the officials see things the cameras can't. Replays overrule the officials where
the cameras see the same things, and the result is different.”)
29
As the venerated English sportswriter Simon Barnes observed, “One thing that sex and
sport have in common is that stupid people like them both. One important difference is that clever
people can enjoy sex—and can say that they enjoy sex—without forfeiting their right to be
considered clever. However, a clever person who claims to enjoy sport will be considered less
clever as a result.” SIMON BARNES, THE MEANING OF SPORT 48 (2006).
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These arguments, in other words, deny premise 3. They are scrutinized and found
wanting in Section III.B.
The most interesting and complex arguments for IVE take on premise 1,
the Pinchbeck Principle. The first argument (Section III.C.1) maintains (on two
distinct grounds) that the league‟s goal should not be to minimize officiating
errors simpliciter, but to minimize weighted officiating errors, where errors
produced by mistakenly reversing an initially correct call are worse than errors
produced by affirming an initially mistaken call. The second argument (Section
III.C.2) would reinterpret the Pinchbeck Principle. On this view, the league‟s
goal should not be to correct officiating mistakes. Instead, it should be to correct
officiating blunders. And while de novo review might correct more mistakes, the
argument continues, it does not correct more blunders.
A. Challenging Premise 2: The IVE Minimizes Total Officiating Mistakes
I have said that the IVE yields more total errors than would a less
deferential standard of review on two assumptions: that replay officials
administering a heightened standard do in fact let stand some calls they believe
are more likely than not mistaken; and that when a replay official believes, based
on all the evidence available to him, that an on-field call was more likely than not
mistaken, he is more likely than not correct. Critics have taken issue with both
premises.
I don‟t know how best to respond to the first objection—that, as one blog
comment put it, “IVE seems to be regularly disregarded and de novo review
regularly applied, so any call to go to a de novo standard would essentially only
codify what the refs are already doing.”30 This is conceivable, though I‟m fairly
confident that it‟s a minority view (Vikings fans don‟t share it), and surely not
one that the NFL itself would advance. More interesting is the second
objection—that the refs do apply a highly deferential standard (true IVE, or
something reasonably close to it), and that doing so is in fact the best way to
minimize total mistaken calls.
People who make this argument often start by emphasizing that the IVE
standard is of review, not of proof. In the law, factual decisions by juries and trial
judges are generally reviewed on appeal under the deferential “clearly erroneous”
standard. The rationale, of course, is not that the trial judge “knows more than
his loftier brothers; rather, he sees more and senses more.”31 He has access to
informal types of evidence—things like witness demeanor and the curious gaps
30

Posting
of
dsimon
to
Slate
available
at
http://fray.slate.com/discuss/forums/thread/3533936.aspx?ArticleID=2239018
31
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
Syr. L. Rev. 635, 663 (1971).
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and pauses in an attorney‟s questioning of a witness—that appear pallidly, if at
all, in the formal written record that appellate courts review. Insofar as an
appellate tribunal might fail to appreciate the extent of the initial decisionmaker‟s
comparative epistemic advantage, a de novo standard of appellate review is likely
to increase rather than decrease factfinding errors. Just as the law‟s “clearly
erroneous” standard is designed to insulate an initial finding from erroneous
reversal, so too, the argument goes, does football‟s IVE standard protect initial
calls precisely because the on-field official is more likely to be right than is the
reviewing official: “the referee (or jury) is most likely to get the call right because
he has seen the actual evidence first-hand, while the reviewing official (or
appellate court) is limited to seeing what was captured on camera (or the court
transcript).”32
I don‟t think so, for an appellate judge stands in a very different
relationship to facts that are disputed at trial than does a replay official to facts
that transpire on the gridiron. The trial judge and the jury do see more and sense
more when it comes to evaluating the testimony of witnesses. But it‟s hard to
swallow that, in general, a single field official sees more through the single pair of
eyes with which nature has endowed him than does the replay official who views
the field of play through, as it were, the lenses of many cameras. And not only
does the replay official have access to multiple camera angles, he views the
images from those cameras in high definition at super slo-motion. Given the
epistemic aids that the replay official enjoys and that the on-field official lacks, it
is implausible that the latter‟s greater physical proximity to the event would make
a decisive difference. Indeed, most sports officials know that video review allows
for more accurate factual determinations than can be made in real time, which is
precisely why some resist instant replay. As Italy‟s Pierluigi Collina, the topranked soccer referee in history, complained: “Referees are blamed because they
are unable to see what can be shown by technology that has made giant steps
forward. No matter how prepared referees are and how hard they work, they will
never be able to compete with technology.”33 So the suggestion that in general the
single on-field official has superior access to the facts than does the replay official
strikes me as patently silly. If all we are concerned about is improving

32
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to
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available
at
http://fray.slate.com/discuss/forums/thread/3539860.aspx?ArticleID=2239018
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Ref Collina Clarifies Comments on Video Officials, Rediff.com, Dec. 30, 2009,
available at http://sports.rediff.com/report/2009/dec/30/referee-collina-clarifies-comments-onvideo-officials.htm. For the ranking of referees by the International Federation of Football History
and Statistics, see “The World‟s Best Referee of the Quarter of the Century,” International
Federation
of
Football
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and
Statistics,
available
at
http://www.iffhs.de/?20e43c03f32b00f31c13f32b17f7370eff3702bb1c2bbb6e08.
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accuracy—getting the final call right—then a de novo standard of review is more
sensible.34
None of this is to deny, however, that, even with the benefit of all this
technology, there are some cases in which the on-field official is better situated to
make the correct call—namely, when he had a particularly fortuitous visual angle
that none of the cameras captured, as might be the case on goal line plays if there
is no camera on the line. So let me clarify one thing. The de novo standard of
review is sometimes described as a directive to the reviewing court to ignore or
disregard the decision of the lower court—to proceed as though writing on a clean
slate.35 Consistent with this description, you might think that were a referee to
review the play afresh, he must ignore the initial call entirely, trying to expunge
from his mind any knowledge of it. That is not my suggestion. The on-field
official is analogous to a judge in some respects. But he‟s analogous to other
legal actors too; referees and umpires are sometimes described as a combination
of judge and police.36 For present purposes, though, it‟s more helpful to think of
him as a third familiar player in a legal drama: the eyewitness.
Were a replay official to review plays de novo, then, far from striving to
wipe from his mind the initial on-field call, he should respect it as the testimony
of an eyewitness. Like all eyewitness testimony, sometimes it‟s really good
evidence, sometimes not. But anytime the video evidence leaves a replay official
close to equipoise, he‟d be wise, even when applying de novo review, to go with
the on-field call. This wouldn‟t be a matter of deferring to a judgment that
departs from his own, but of reaching a judgment based on all the available

34

One commentator has opined that “[a] de novo standard and the absence of deference it
entails would suggest that there is little confidence in on-site officials‟ ability to generally make
the right call.” Guggenheim, supra note __, at 578. Not so. A de novo standard suggests (indeed,
assumes) only that the on-site official does not generally have greater ability to make the right call
than does the replay official—although, as the text goes on to explain, such a standard could and
should be used in a way that recognizes that the on-site official will sometimes have greater ability
to make the right call than would the reviewing official. Ironically, if any standard suggests a lack
of confidence in officials‟ ability, it‟s the IVE, which suggests little confidence in the ability of
those reviewing the play to make the right call notwithstanding the patent epistemic advantages
they enjoy.
35
See, e.g., Mayer v. Montgomery County, 794 A.2d 704, 716 (Md. App. 2002) (“A de
novo proceeding is one that starts fresh, on a clean slate, without regard to prior proceedings and
determinations. A true trial de novo ... puts all parties back at „square one‟ to begin again just as if
the adjudication appealed from had never occurred.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted;
emphasis added).
36
See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law Revisited, 25 Thom. Jeff. L.
Rev. 17, 25 (2002).
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evidence—including the contemporaneous report of a well-positioned witness to
the event.37
B. Challenging Premise 3: A De Novo Standard Imposes More Costs than IVE
The third premise in the argument against entrenchment is, thus far, the
least well supported. Indeed, the claim that a de novo standard would not
meaningfully increase the costs of review has to this point just been asserted, not
argued for. My strategy, following a natural enough dialectic, is to consider
contrary arguments here, as challenges to the prima facie case against IVE. Some
considerations in favor of IVE—those that focus on reversal as itself a cost—
could be couched as arguments either that de novo review imposes greater overall
costs than IVE or that de novo review does not minimize total weighted errors. I
will defer discussion of those arguments to the next section. Here we assess
purported reasons not linked to the supposedly greater costs flowing from each act
of reversal why the costs of a reply system increase as the standard of review
becomes less stringent.
1. De novo review produces too much delay. The introduction of video
replay slows down the game. No doubt about it. That‟s one reason to eliminate
instant replay entirely. Now, the NFL power structure doesn‟t think it‟s good
enough on balance, and I happen to agree. But if you think otherwise, and
assuming your view isn‟t based on a mistake about the empirics—say, about how
much time video replay adds—then I have nothing to say to persuade you
37

Compare Judge Jack Weinstein‟s observation that “ „de novo,‟ while reflecting the
usual Latin obscurantism of the law, does not really mean the judge will decide as on a clean slate
without considering the decision of the administrator (or on appeal the decision also of the trial
court). Even the most egocentric federal judge applying de novo review will give some weight to
what the presumably more expert or experienced plan administrator actually did, even if that
weight is applied sub rosa or subconsciously.” Mood v. Prudential Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp.2d 267,
271 (EDNY 2005). Consider too debates over the proper review of patent claims construction
after the Supreme Court‟s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370
(1996). See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (Plager, J., concurring) (“Though we review [the] record „de novo,‟ meaning without
applying a formally deferential standard of review, common sense dictates that the trial judge's
view will carry weight.”); id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“[O]ur adoption of the rule that
claim construction is an issue of law does not mean that we intend to disregard the work done by
district courts in claim construction or that we will give no weight to a district court's conclusion
as to claim construction, no matter how the court may have reached that conclusion.... [W]e
approach the legal issue of claim construction recognizing that with respect to certain aspects of
the task, the district court may be better situated than we are, and that as to those aspects we
should be cautious about substituting our judgment for that of the district court.”).
I am open to the possibility that, for this reason, a referee engaged in de novo review
might properly have upheld the on-field ruling that Meachem had made a clean reception in
overtime of the 2010 NFC Championship Game.
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otherwise. Arguments that could decisively adjudicate this particular tension
between the competing values of accuracy and finality are not in the cards.
But the issue isn‟t whether to implement video replay or not, it‟s what the
standard of review should be once it is implemented. Total delay is a function of
two variables: the number of challenges and the time taken to review each one.
So a heightened standard like IVE might conceivably speed up the game—or, put
better, reduce the delays that video replay introduces—by addressing either of
these factors. It might deter challenges, or it might reduce the time for review
once a challenge is initiated (or it might do both).38
We don‟t want challenges because they disrupt the flow of the game,
making it less aesthetically pleasing and trying fans‟ patience. True, we might
suppose that, once a call has been challenged, we want to get it right. But we
employ a heightened standard as a way to reduce the challenges in the first place,
for a coach is less likely to challenge a call, thereby disrupting play, to the extent
he thinks his challenge will fail (at the cost of a timeout). In a sense, then, the
IVE could be understood as a type of threat justified principally on grounds of
deterrence: even if carrying out the threat (that challenged calls will be reviewed
under a highly deferential standard instead of under a standard calculated to
maximize accuracy) is costly, the policy might nonetheless be justified all things
considered by the good that the threat produces—invisibly, as it were—by
preventing disruptions that would otherwise occur.
Although this chain of reasoning does not provide a good explanation for
the NFL‟s initial adoption of IVE,39 no doubt the standard of review should affect
the number of challenges in just this way were coaches not limited in the number
of challenges they could make. But they are limited—to a paltry two challenges
per game (and a third if the first two succeed). We need to know, then, whether,
given the cap, coaches would challenge more plays were the standard de novo
and, if so, what the aggregate increase in review-associated delay would be.
For at least two reasons, challenges and delays might be expected to
increase under a less strict standard of review notwithstanding the existing limit
on challenges. First, the fact is that coaches do not use up all their challenges
under the present system. Since 2004, the number of coaches‟ challenges made
38

Although delay is one of the most common arguments given by defenders of a
heightened standard of review, see, e.g., Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 9, at 63, these two
mechanisms are rarely distinguished.
39
The IVE standard was in place when the NFL first implemented replay review back in
1986 even though review was initiated by the replay official and not by the head coaches. While I
do not believe that a justification for a practice is discredited merely because it arises post hoc,
some might think that the fact that this rationale wasn‟t a plausible explanation licenses skepticism
about its force.
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each season has remained fairly constant at nearly 1 per game (not per team).40
Under a significantly more lenient standard, however, we might reasonably expect
coaches to come close to exhausting their allowed challenges, yielding perhaps as
many as three more reviews per game, 41 and conceivably as many as five
additional reviews if two successful challenges still earned coaches a third.
Second, perhaps we should not treat the existence of a hard ceiling as a given. No
doubt the league could limit coaches to two challenges per game (and three if the
first two were successful) no matter what the standard of review. But pressure to
increase the number of allowed challenges might increase as the reviewing
standard becomes less demanding. Fans often bristle when, because it has
exhausted its challenges or its time outs, their team is unable to challenge a call
that appears ripe for reversal, and there will be many more such instances the
lower the standard of review. So a relaxation of the standard of review from IVE
to de novo might bring within its train an increase in the number of challenges
each team is permitted.
I am not impressed by the second argument. Any pressure to give coaches
more challenges is resistible. If, in the event, it isn‟t resisted, that will bespeak a
judgment that correcting additional errors is worth the price in somewhat greater
delay.
The first argument, however, cannot be so easily dismissed: almost
certainly, more calls would be challenged were the league to lower the standard of
review while preserving the basics of its current replay system. Still, the league
would have several means available to mitigate the impact on total game time.
First, if least significantly, the league could repeal the rule that awards a team a
third challenge when its first two are successful.42 Second, delay would decline if
booth challenges were abandoned, and a lower standard of review would make
that salutary change more palatable. Since 2004, two replay trends stand out:
first, the number of booth-initiated reviews has steadily increased while the
number of coaches‟ challenges has remained nearly constant at 300 per season;
second, while the coaches have been increasingly successful with their challenges,
the success rate for booth-initiated review has fluctuated from a low of 22% in
40

See statistics at nflgsis.com.
Then again, because “timeouts are precious,” see Dave Anderson, Replay Instant
Replay,
NY
TIMES,
Marc.
11,
1997,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/11/sports/replay-instant-replay.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm
(quoting Bill Parcells), coaches would still use their challenges cautiously even if the likelihood of
success were somewhat greater than it is now.
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As I will explain later, I think that rule is appropriate—indeed, probably too
grudging—when the standard is IVE. See infra Section IV.C. But a hard cap is much less
objectionable when the standard is de novo. This is essentially for reasons that track the
mistake/blunder distinction to be introduced infra Section III.C.2.
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2004 to a high of 35.64% in 2007. In 2010, nearly 44% of all coaches‟ challenges
were successful compared to a mere 25% for booth-initiated reviews.43 What all
this means, of course, is that booth-initiated reviews contribute disproportionately
to total replay-associated delay while offering considerably less in the way of
error-correction.
At the same time, booth reviews often interfere significantly with the
game‟s competitive dynamic because they stop the clock during a period of the
game in which the teams are particularly likely to have asymmetric interests in
stoppage—either the offense benefits because it‟s rushing against the clock, or the
defense welcomes stoppage so it can catch its breath and make desired
substitutions against a hurry-up offense. Against all this, booth review is justified
on the grounds that, during the high-pressured end of halves, coaches shouldn‟t
face the added burden of having to decide quickly, before their assistants have
reviewed the play from the broadcast feeds, whether to challenge close calls.
That‟s a defensible judgment. However, coaches will need less time to decide
whether to pull the trigger if they face a less deferential standard of review.
Other reasons to worry less about added delay derive from a consideration
already mentioned: total delay is a function not only of the number of calls
reviewed, but also the average duration of each review. Presumably, the replay
official will frequently exhaust the limited time allotted him no matter what the
standard of review is. So a choice between these two standards will affect review
time in only two circumstances. If the reviewing official comes quickly to
conclude with confidence that, regardless of whether the initial call was correct,
no more careful attention to additional camera angles will be able to establish that
that call was indisputably mistaken, then the IVE standard would permit him to
wrap things up faster than would a de novo standard. On the other hand, if he
promptly determines that the initial call was wrong more likely than not, and
would use additional time only to mine for the shot that would seal the deal—that
is, to assure himself that the incorrectness of the on-field call is indisputable—
then the de novo standard would speed things up. My sense, as a reasonably
experienced spectator, is that the latter circumstance is likely to predominate over
the former. If so, we might expect a slight reduction in average time of review
under de novo review even if the league keeps its present 60-second limit on the
time a referee may watch the video. Even more importantly, the league might feel
emboldened to further lower the time limit. Lastly, there are other ways too that
the league could reduce the average time for review. I‟ll propose one in Part IV.
2. De novo review facilitates corruption. A second reason to believe that
de novo review would be costlier than IVE invokes what one sports fan has
43
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dubbed “the Tim Donaghy angle” after the disgraced NBA referee. 44 The theory
is that “requiring a high standard of review for replay discourages refs from
intentionally making wrong calls at key moments,” which in turn deters refs from
agreeing to fix games.45
That‟s possible. But the argument overlooks a flip side: a high standard
also reduces the likelihood that mistaken on-field calls will be reversed, thereby
increasing ability of all the officials other than the referee to fix games.
Moreover, that most subjective of officiating calls—pass interference—is also
among the calls that can most influence a game‟s outcome. Yet it has always
been, and is likely to remain, unreviewable. (Recall the questionable defensive
pass interference call against Viking linebacker Ben Leber on the Saints‟ gamewinning overtime drive in the 2010 NFC Championship Game. Similarly, Seattle
Seahawks fans are still seething over the offensive pass interference call against
wide receiver Darrell Jackson that nullified a touchdown reception in the first
quarter of Super Bowl XL.) As a consequence, a corrupt field judge, side judge
or back judge has about all the latitude he‟d need to affect results regardless of the
standard of replay review. On balance, then, the IVE would seem to trivially
affect the NFL‟s vulnerability to game-fixing by rogue officials.
C. Challenging Premise 1: The NFL‟s Goal Is Not Mistake-Correction
The third possible defense of IVE runs through premise 1, the Pinchbeck
Principle. At first blush, the Pinchbeck Principle would seem uncontroversial.
To be sure, reasonable people might, for various reasons, disfavor instant replay
entirely. But once we have decided to employ it, we must be trying to correct
officiating errors and should therefore want (all else equal) to correct more of
whatever errors there be, not fewer. Because the Pinchbeck Principle seems so
unobjectionable, it will take more effort to uncover and to clearly formulate
possible challenges to it.
Start with the claim that the league shouldn‟t give a fig about correcting
errors. As opponents of instant replay review frequently object, “an argument can
be made that the human factor—in this case a blown call that costs a team
dearly—is part of the game, part of its lore.”46 Now, I‟m not entirely sure what
this means. That blown calls are part of the game in the sense that they have
existed, do now exist, and are not entirely eliminable is beyond dispute. But as
44

Although he confessed to giving mobsters inside information about games, for which
offense he served 15 months in federal prison, Donaghy has steadfastly denied intentionally
miscalling games in which he officiated.
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Posting
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Slate
available
at
http://fray.slate.com/discuss/forums/thread/3534640.aspx?ArticleID=2239018
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Tony Long, “March 11, 1986: NFL Adopts Instant Replay,” Wired, Mar. 11, 2009,
available at http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2009/03/dayintech_0311.
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Hume taught, it‟s a fallacy to derive an “ought” from an “is”. Murder, rape and
robbery are similarly part of human social life. Yet surely that‟s no reason to
tolerate more of it than we must.
The claim, accordingly, is not merely that officiating errors are
ineradicable but that they are good, that we should not want to reduce them even
were it costless to do so. Then-coach of the Chicago Bears Ron Rivera expressed
this position emphatically after he saw his team lose to the rival Packers on a
reversed call: “I can‟t wait for them to get rid of instant replay. . . . They have
definitely taken out human error and the human nature of football. It‟s out. We
might as well just put robots in the football game and let them play.” 47 Or as
George Will put it, “Human error is not a blemish to be expunged from sports, it
is part of the drama.”48 True enough: sport would lose its value in a world of
human infallibility. A home run is grand only in a context in which the batter
might have failed. But the use to which this observation is put by defenders of a
heightened standard of review—and by those who oppose instant replay
entirely—relies upon a failure to distinguish human errors by players from human
errors by officials. Sports law professor Howard Wasserman makes clear, when
explaining his opposition to instant replay, that he equates the two. “[I]f we
accept inevitable mistakes by players trying their best,” he asks, “why not also
accept inevitable mistakes by officials trying their best?”49
But this question is only too easy to answer: We watch sports to witness
great athletic feats, and the greatness of those feats is enhanced by the everpresent possibility, sometimes realized, of failure and error. However, we do not
watch sports to see great officiating feats. We want the officials to remain in the
background—which is why, while many commentators mocked Chief Justice
Roberts‟s contention, made during his confirmation hearings, that “judges are like
umpires,” not one, as far as I‟m aware, took issue with his observation that
“nobody ever want to a ball game to see the umpire.” 50 Simply put, unlike
47

Fred Mitchell, Picture Fuzzy to Bears, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 6, 1989, at C1, quoted
in Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 9.
48
George Will, The End of the Umpire? Foul!, CHI.CAGOTRIBUNE, June 19, 2008, at
C27.
49
Posting of Howard M. Wasserman to Sports Law Blog, Howard Wasserman, “Against
Instant Replay,” Sports Law Blog, Sept. 10, 2007, available at http://sportslaw.blogspot.com/2007_09_01_archive.html. In the same vein—though provoking the question
“Does Wilson know what catchers do?”—Buffalo Bills owner Ralph Wilson objected to instant
replay, reasoning that “it takes the human element out of the game, that it‟s like baseball doing
away with the catcher and using a computer to call balls and strikes.” Thomas George, Owners
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N.Y. TIMES,
March
3,
1990,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/13/sports/owners-renew-the-instant-replay.html.
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For criticism of the analogy, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Interpretation:
Non-originalism, Philosophy Compass (forthcoming).
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players‟ errors, officials‟ errors serve no useful purpose as foil to the greatness
that we hope to glimpse. And there is no danger that efforts to reduce—and even,
in places, to eliminate—officials‟ errors will threaten to eliminate players‟ errors
too.51
In any event, the present question is not whether to have instant replay
review. The answer to that question we are taking as settled. It is hard to fight
the proposition that the rationale for instant replay is to correct officiating errors.
(What else might it be?) A frontal assault on the Pinchbeck Principle is therefore
extremely unpromising. The third set of arguments, then, seek to refine or modify
the Pinchbeck Principle in such a way as to render false one or both of the
additional premises (the error-minimization premise, and the not-prohibitivelycostly premise) needed to generate a conclusion against IVE. One set of such
arguments maintains that the goal should be to minimize total weighted errors,
and that erroneous reversal is more costly than is affirmance of erroneous initial
calls. A second set accepts that the goal is to minimize errors, but redefines errors
in a way different from how we have understood it thus far, a redefinition that
would make the second premise false.
1. The IVE minimizes total weighted errors. We have said that, on
plausible assumptions, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard minimizes
total adjudicatory errors. It is the law‟s favored standard of proof when it deems
errors in favor of each party to a lawsuit equally bad. But there is no necessary
reason why both errors must be equally bad. And when they are not, minimizing
51

I anticipate that most readers will agree with this, on reflection. Those who are
unpersuaded might reflect on the increased use of advanced technology not to review calls initially
made by humans but to replace human decisionmakers in the first instance. For example, lets in
tennis, wall touch in swimming, and points in fencing are all determined by technological means
without relying upon direct human perception. Few fans, other than the most antiquarian or
nostalgic, think that the introduction of such devices is a loss so long as adequately persuaded of
their accuracy. But see Harry Collins, The Philosophy of Umpiring and the Introduction of
Decision-Aid Technology, 37 J. Phil. Sport 135 (2010) (objecting to such devices when they offer
a precision that substantially exceeds that which participants and spectators can perceive). In any
event, nobody objects to such solutions on the grounds that they eliminate the opportunity for
officiating error. Well, almost nobody. Oldfather and Fernholz argue that dramatic considerations
have persuaded the NFL to preserve its low-tech chain system for measuring first downs despite
the availability of several more precise high-tech alternatives. See Oldfather & Fernholz, supra
note 9, at 74 (citing John Branch, In High-Tech Game, Football Sticks to an Old Measure of
Success,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
1,
2009,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/sports/football/01chains.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1).
I
believe, however, that they overstate the importance to the NFL of “[t]he drama of close
measurements.” As I read it, the article that Oldfather and Fernholz cite suggests that the league‟s
principal objections to laser-based alternatives are their high cost and the fact that they promise
only trivial marginal increases in accuracy given that the officials‟ spot of the ball would remain
highly imprecise.
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total errors should not be the goal of an adjudicatory system. Instead, the system
goal should be to minimize total weighted error.52
As readers know, this is not abstract or hypothetical, but reflects the
conventional justification for criminal law‟s heightened standard of proof. As in
tort or breach of contract actions, a criminal trial can result in four basic
outcomes, as represented by the following matrix.
The Verdict

Guilty
Defendant Guilty
The
Facts

Defendant Not
Guilty

True
False
(positive)

Not guilty
False
(negative)
True

But in this context, most persons think that the two types of error are not
equal. No doubt about it: acquitting a guilty defendant is a bad outcome. Not
only does it leave him free to reoffend, but many people believe that punishing
him is a good thing all on its own because, gosh darn it, he deserves it.53 But as
bad as that might be, most folks think that it is far worse to convict and punish
someone who‟s innocent. This is a hard thing to establish to the satisfaction of
those who don‟t see it intuitively, for degrees or amounts of badness (or of
goodness) are elusive properties. We can‟t just point and say “see, this is how
bad it is to be deprived of liberty and stigmatized undeservedly.” Nonetheless, if
52

We might say that minimizing weighted error is always the goal (keeping other costs
constant). But when the weights or costs of each type of error are equal, minimizing total errors
and minimizing total weighted errors amount to the same thing. Either way, I am indulging the
modestly simplifying assumption that the two types of correct decisions are equally good.
Interesting recent work on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof challenges that
assumption for criminal trials. See Larry Laudan & Harry D. Saunders, Re-Thinking the Criminal
Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus About the Utilities of Trial Outcomes, 7 Int‟l Comm. On
Evidence 2, 1-33 (2009). But the assumption that, when it comes to reviewing on-field calls,
correct affirmances and correct reversals are at least very close to equally good seems sound.
53
What precisely is the “it” that he deserves—to be punished? to suffer? Something
else? For thoughts on this important question that theorists of the criminal law routinely overlook
see Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in R.A. DUFF & STUART GREEN, THE
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (OUP 2011).
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we can ultimately do little more than admit to “a fundamental value judgment”
that punishing the innocent is the greater harm or evil, it is one value judgment
that seems to be widely shared.54 (At least, it‟s widely shared in Anglo-American
culture, not necessarily at all times and places. Otto von Bismarck, first
Chancellor of the German Empire, opined that “it is better that ten innocent men
suffer than one guilty man escape.” And Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder of the
Bolshevik secret police, upon learning of Bismarck‟s view, raised him an
execution: “Better to execute ten innocent men than to leave one guilty man
alive.”55)
There is only one way to ensure that the system will produce no erroneous
convictions: abolish the criminal law, or (much the same) initiate no criminal
prosecutions. That‟s what we call a cure worse than the disease. The better
alternative is to accept the inevitability that some innocent persons will be
convicted and punished, while implementing procedural protections designed to
minimize that outcome at acceptable cost. Such protections can operate at the
various discrete stages in the system of criminal punishment, including at arrest
and at formal charging. The procedural device that serves most directly to reduce
the likelihood of convicting those innocent persons who aren‟t weeded out at the
earlier stages and end up being brought to trial is a heightened standard of proof.
And that, of course, is the function of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
employed throughout Anglo-American criminal law. Instead of being instructed
to adjudge the defendant guilty so long as persuaded that his guilt is more likely
than not, factfinders are required to acquit unless persuaded of the defendant‟s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
This is a pretty good way to reduce false positives. But it too comes at a
price: Relative to the more-likely-than-not standard, it results in a greater number
of false negatives—acquittals of persons who are guilty. This is probably
obvious. After all, the whole point of ratcheting up the standard of proof is to
ensure that some defendants who would have been convicted under the default
more-likely-than-not standard will be acquitted. And some number of those
acquitted folks are in fact guilty. So increasing the standard of proof produces
two consequences: fewer convictions of innocent persons and more acquittals of
guilty persons.
Less obvious to my first-year law students—but vastly important—is that
the increase in erroneous acquittals outpaces the decrease in erroneous
convictions, so that (on reasonable assumptions) the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
54

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 173, 195 (1997). The
delightful phrase “raised him an execution” is Volokh‟s.
55

REPLAY (3/7/2011)

28

standard produces more total errors (false negatives and false positives combined)
than does the more-likely-than-not standard. The idea is intuitive enough. For
one thing, we have already said that the more-likely-than-not standard operates to
minimize total errors. That wouldn‟t be so if departures from that standard
produced just as few total errors.
The point can be grasped more easily, perhaps, if we translate these verbal
standards into rough numerical equivalents. The more-likely-than-not standard is
essentially a directive to find for the defendant unless one has at least .51
confidence in his guilt; the numerical equivalent to the beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard is more controversial and probably even less realistic,56 but most
commentators usually peg it in the .90-.95 confidence range.57 The only cases
affected by a choice between the more-likely-than-not and the beyond-areasonable-doubt standards are those in which the factfinder‟s confidence in guilt
lies someplace between .51 and, say, .90. (When the jury is less than .51
confident in the defendant‟s guilt, they should acquit under either standard; when
they are more than .90 confident in his guilt, they should convict under either
standard.) If, as we assumed earlier, jurors‟ beliefs about a defendant‟s guilt track
reality pretty well in the aggregate, then it must be that a majority of defendants in
these cases are in fact guilty. So for every innocent defendant who is acquitted
under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard but would have been convicted
under the more-likely-than-not standard, more than one defendant who is
acquitted under the heightened standard but would have been convicted under the
lower standard is in fact guilty. In sum: the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
of proof predictably generates more total errors—erroneous acquittals and
erroneous convictions combined—than would the more-likely-than-not standard.
Then why use it? Here we just repeat a point made above: the two types
of error are not deemed to be equally costly; false positives are much worse than
false negatives. So although the heightened standard produces a greater number
of errors, the ordinary more-likely-than-not standard produces a greater weight of
56

Psychologists are uncertain just how nuanced human confidence judgments actually
are. No doubt the human confidence scale is not calibrated in hundredths: outside of games of
chance and similar contexts in which we internalize frequentist probabilities, it would be bizarre to
claim to be, say, .58 confident that p. Beyond that, however, about all that psychologists are
agreed upon is that, between the poles of being “certain” that some proposition is true and being
precisely in “equipoise,” humans can reliably distinguish only among limited categories of
subjective confidence, frequently grouping their judgments in such broad clusters as more likely
than not, very likely, and almost certain. For a recent experimental study of how coarse or finegrained are people‟s probability judgments, see Yanlong Sun et al., Probabilistic Judgment on a
Coarser Scale, 9 Cognitive Sys. Res. 161 (2008).
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See, e.g., Daniel A. Krauss & Joel D. Lieberman, Psychology in the Court Room, 133
(Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2009).
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total errors. Put another way, when the two errors are of different magnitudes,
then a standard that departs from more-likely-than-not is needed to minimize total
weighted errors.
If all this is so, then we see a possible defense of the IVE standard for
instant replay review: if the costs of mistakenly reversing a correct call are simply
greater than those of mistakenly affirming an incorrect one. On this rationale, the
indisputable standard of review yields a greater number of total errors, but less
weighted error. Because this rationale would defend the system by analogizing,
not to the clearly erroneous legal standard of review (as the first argument for IVE
did), but to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt legal standard of proof, then our
friendly two-by-two matrix, suitably tweaked, might again provide illumination.
Result of Review
Affirm
Correct

Correct Final Call

Reverse
Mistaken Final Call
(Erroneous Reversal)

Initial
Call
Incorrect

Mistaken Final Call
(Erroneous Affirmance)

Correct Final Call

As the matrix nicely displays, there are only two possible final outcomes
for the final call: it can be correct or incorrect. But these two possibilities
correspond to four permutations, for there are two different routes to each of the
two possible end states. Moving clockwise from the upper left, they are: (1) a
correct call affirmed; (2) a correct initial call changed to an incorrect one; (3) an
incorrect initial call reversed; and (4) an incorrect initial call preserved. If a
mistaken final call in the upper right (possibility 2) is worse than a mistaken final
call in the bottom left (possibility 4), it must be because the value or disvalue of
the final outcomes varies depending upon the route traveled to reach them: going
from a correct initial call to an incorrect final call is worse than starting with an
incorrect initial call and preserving it.
Why ever would that be?
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Before hunting down that answer, it is time to get a clearer handle on the
reason for doubt—the reason, that is, to think that the badness of a mistaken final
call is independent of the route traveled to reach it.
We want the contest to proceed on the path that the players‟ own efforts
and accomplishments warrant. If you catch the ball cleanly for a ten-yard gain,
your team deserves to move ten yards down field. If you kick the ball off the
crossbar and over the goal line, your team deserves to be credited with a goal. If
the ball beats the batter-runner to first base, the fielding team deserves to record
an out. (For extra credit: what if the ball and the batter-runner reach first at the
same time?)58 Every mistaken call—the failure to register as a reception a ball
cleanly caught, the imposition of a yardage penalty for a phantom infraction, and
so on—is something to be avoided and regretted precisely because it upsets this
58

Well, as everybody knows, “the tie goes to the runner.” So if the ball and batter reach
first simultaneously, you answered, the batter-runner deserves to be called “safe.”
Not so fast!
Universal sandlot wisdom about ties might trace to Major League Baseball Rule 6.05(j),
which provides that “A batter is out when after a third strike or after he hits a fair ball, he or first
base is tagged before he touches first base.” If the batter reaches first at the same time that first
base is tagged, then the base hasn‟t been tagged “before” he touches it. And so, one might
reasonably surmise, he must be called safe. Unfortunately, two other rules indicate that that
conclusion would be too quick.
Rule 6.09(a) provides that “the batter becomes a runner when he hits a fair ball.” That
seems both obvious and unproblematic. Rule 7.08(e), however, provides that “Any runner is out
when he fails to reach the next base before a fielder tags him or the base, after he has been forced
to advance by reason of the batter becoming a runner.” That is, on a force play, the runner—
including, per Rule 6.09(a), the batter who has become the runner—is out unless he reaches the
base before the ball does. So it now appears that the rules are hopelessly contradictory: according
to Rule 6.05(j), the tie goes to the runner; according to Rule 7.08(e), the tie goes to the fielder.
Indeed, that is precisely the conclusion reached by the sleuth, the philosopher Ted Cohen, who
first identified this troubling interaction among the rules in a marvelous essay. Ted Cohen, There
Are No Ties at First Base, 79 The Yale Review 31 (Winter, 1990) (reprinted in Eric Bronson ed.,
Baseball and Philosophy: Thinking Outside the Batter‟s Box 73-86 (2004) (explaining that when
he drew this contradiction to MLB officials, advising them to remedy it, he was rebuffed on the
grounds that, according to the umpires, “there never are any ties”).
But do the rules really conflict, requiring a choice between them in the case of a tie?
Strictly speaking, no. Rule 6.05(j) says only that a batter-runner is out if first base is tagged before
he touches it. The rule does not say that a batter-runner is safe if first base is tagged at the same
that he touches it. To be sure, that is the most natural implication. As Cohen puts it, that is the
rule‟s “import because the other rules do not give any other reason for calling him out.” I‟d say,
rather, that that would be the rule‟s inescapable import if the rules did not give any other reason
for calling him out. But they do—that‟s the effect of Rules 6.09(a) and 7.08(e). So the apparent
contradiction can be escaped by reading 6.05(j) literally, refusing to indulge its negative
implication. Cf. Royal American Oil & Gas Co. v. Szafranski, 147 B.R. 976, 982 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1992) (stating the risks of negative inference as a method of statutory construction). And if
we choose that path, we are left with a simple rule: ties go to the fielder!
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scheme of institutional desert, of how the contest ought to proceed. All mistaken
final calls—and only mistaken final calls—work this particular and most basic
mischief. What makes an erroneous reversal of an initially correct call bad—
something that it is to be both avoided and regretted—is precisely what makes the
failure to reverse an incorrect call bad. In either case, the final call is incorrect,
causing the rest of the contest to proceed on a different path than the ability and
effort of the competitors themselves would have warranted. Moreover, because
justice is, plausibly, the virtue of allocating goods in accordance with desert, any
steps taken to reduce mistaken final calls promote justice.
To see the fundamental equivalence between erroneous reversals and
erroneous affirmances more clearly—and to appreciate that there might even be
something artificial or arbitrary about breaking down the officials‟ calls into
initial call and final call—put aside instant replay review for the moment and
think only about the common interplay among the on-field officials, like when the
side judge initially signals a completion before the field judge rules incomplete, or
when, after consultation on the field, the referee picks up a flag and announces
“there was no infraction on the play.” In these cases we don‟t think that the initial
call should be somehow protected against reversal; we want the call to be right.
And when we say “the call” we mean “the final call.” Indeed, the NFL Referees‟
Manual is very clear on just this point. During crew conferences, it instructs
referees: “Don‟t worry if you feel the decision making process is taking more
time than you would like or looks bad. The important thing is to get it right!” 59 If
this is so, then the conclusion wouldn‟t seem to differ even if more intermediate
steps lie between initial call and final call. If we want the referee to announce the
call he believes is most likely correct regardless of what the official who first
weighed in believed, we should also want him to make the call he believes is most
likely correct regardless of what he had first announced.
Even granting all this (as I believe we should), erroneous reversal would
still be worse than erroneous affirmance if reversal itself is a bad. Existing
arguments for IVE could be interpreted as maintaining precisely that.
(a) Reversal is bad because it promotes disrespect for officials. One of the
most commonly voiced justifications for a highly deferential standard of review
maintains that it usefully serves the league‟s need to protect the integrity of the
game or to preserve respect for the authority of the referees. I confess that I am
uncertain what “integrity of the game” means to all those who voice it.
If by “integrity” we mean something like temporal continuity, then the
simple rejoinder is that football already and utterly lacks integrity of this sort,
59
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2009 National Football League Referees‟ Manual, National Football League, 53
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which is one reason that Europeans, accustomed to the uninterrupted play of
soccer, haven‟t really taken to it. Or if “integrity of the game” captures the idea
that mistaken on-field calls are elements that cannot be excised without real loss
then this seems much like the “blown calls are part of the lore” argument that
we‟ve just dismissed. Finally, if the phrase is meant to suggest that more frequent
reversals would challenge the moral integrity of the officials or of other persons
associated with the game, the claim should strike us as utterly implausible.
Most likely, “integrity of the game” is intended just as a fancier and more
emphatic restatement of the more transparently expressed claim with which it
almost invariably shares the stage: the need to preserve respect for the officials.60
So how exactly does the IVE standard preserve respect for the officials, and just
how valuable is that benefit?
The idea, I suppose, is that there is always something harmful about a
public reversal of an on-field call even when that reversal sets things right. The
public reversal is costly because it tends to undermine the officials‟ authority. To
be sure, it‟s good if the final call is right and bad if the final call is wrong. But, on
this view, it is worse for a final incorrect call to emerge as the reversal of an
initially correct call than as the affirmance of an initially incorrect one precisely
because the former contains a feature of negative value that the latter lacks: the
very fact of reversal. (And, by the same reasoning, it is less good for a final
correct call to emerge as the reversal of an initially incorrect call than as the
affirmance of an initially correct one.) We can illustrate this claim by adding to
our matrix the following arbitrary but illustrative values: that a call is ultimately
correct confers a value of +2, that a call is ultimately incorrect confers a value of 2, and that a call has been publicly reversed confers a value of -1.
Result of Review
Affirm

Reverse (-1)
Mistaken Final Call

Correct
Initial
60

Correct Final Call (+2)

(Erroneous Reversal)
(-3)

See, e.g., Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 9, at 63 (“The NFL . . . has to worry about
institutional integrity. If the NFL instituted a lower standard of review for challenged plays, more
calls would likely be overturned. This could eventually impact the public perception of the
competency of NFL officiating crews.”); Guggenheim, supra note 26, at 569 (opining that IVE “is
crucial because it maintains the credibility of the officials and avoids fickle determinations by the
referee”).
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Mistaken Final Call

Incorrect

(Erroneous Affirmance)

Correct Final Call (+1)

(-2)

On this construal of the “respect for officials” defense of the IVE standard,
the review system should be structured not to minimize the costs of error, but to
minimize the costs of review, which costs are a function both of the incorrectness
of final calls and the number of reversals, inter alia. Because the fact of reversal
is itself a cost, we do in fact yield differential costs of outcome depending on the
route we took to get there: a mistaken final call produced by incorrectly reversing
a correct initial call is more costly than a mistaken final call produced by
incorrectly affirming an incorrect initial call.
There may be something to this. But not nearly enough, I think, to support
a standard of review as demanding as IVE.61
Most importantly, let‟s not overstate the extent to which a reversal
undermines respect for officials. It might well be that a widespread perception
that officials are getting things wrong would threaten to breed disrespect (or less
respect) for them. But it seems unlikely that such a perception will be
substantially influenced by the total number of reversals of on-field calls. Fans,
owners, coaches, and players get to watch and rewatch the play in super slo-mo,
from a variety of camera angles, all in high definition. Therefore, we don‟t need a
formal announcement by the referee that an on-field call was mistaken in order to
conclude that the field official got it wrong; it‟s the evidence from our own eyes
that licenses such a conclusion. In short, people will come to disrespect the
officials if the “visual evidence” suggests to viewers at home that the officials are
doing a bad job. If that‟s how it appears, the fact that the calls are rarely reversed
won‟t protect the officials‟ reputation; and if that‟s not how it appears, then more
frequent reversals won‟t imperil it. Indeed, the fact that referees reverse their own
61

A related but distinct concern is that a lower standard would generate more reversals
which would thereby threaten intra-crew harmony. Oldfather and Fernholz, supra note 9, at 52.
This worry rings hollow to me, though I confess that I‟m going mostly on untutored intuition here,
and can offer no reason that even I find compelling why the reader who lacks intuitions one way
or the other should credit my assessment of this worry over Oldfather and Fernholz‟s contrary
assessment. Still, I‟ll offer two thoughts that go beyond merely reporting my sense of things.
First, if reversal by the referee were a real danger to intra-crew collegiality, we might expect
referees to adhere strictly to the IVE standard. If you believe, as many do, that the standard in
practice is not quite as demanding as true IVE, you might take that as some evidence that intrabranch harmony is not quite so fragile. Second, insofar as there is merit to this concern, we might
expect that referees operating under a formal de novo standard would be somewhat more
deferential in practice, which prediction ought to mitigate some of the objections to relaxing the
rule.
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initial calls is further evidence that officials want to get calls right and are not
overly sensitive about being reversed.62
In any event, the IVE doesn‟t merely accommodate solicitude for the
officials‟ reputation, but allows it to swamp what would seem to be a much more
fundamental concern: getting the calls right. Even if some bias against reversal
might be warranted, the IVE reflects a bias so pronounced as to suggest that the
league has lost sight of the reason for instituting replay review in the first place. 63
When reputational interests and accuracy come into conflict, Major League
Baseball knows where to strike the proper balance. “Umpire dignity is
important,” the official rule book acknowledges, “but never as important as „being
right.‟”64
Finally, not only does a concern for the officials‟ dignitary interests not
justify the costs that IVE produces, such a high standard plausibly risks
increasing disrespect for officials in two ways. First, insofar as the fact of
reversal alone could be perceived as a rebuke, the force of that rebuke varies with
the standard of review applied. Although a reversal under the IVE standard is
most fairly rendered as a determination that, clearly, the initial call was mistaken,
it can easily be misunderstood as a determination that the initial call was clearly
mistaken. To anticipate a distinction to come, it is apt to be misperceived as a
conclusion not just that the official made a mistake, but that he blundered.
Reversal under the de novo standard does not plausibly send a similar message.
In short, there will be more reversals under a de novo standard of review than

62

One of the most notorious reversals in NFL history—the call that made the “Tuck
Rule” famous—was referee Walt Coleman‟s overturning of his own initial call that Patriot QB
Tom Brady had fumbled with less than two minutes remaining in a 2002 playoff game against the
Raiders. See Richard Sandomir, Referees Turn to Video Aid More Often, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2002, at D1.
63
I am assuming that a nontrivial, perhaps significant, number of calls appear, after
review, to be probably but not indisputably wrong. These are the calls that would come out
differently under the de novo and IVE standards. However, some readers of this manuscript have
offered the contrary speculation that, when the replays do not make it indisputably clear what the
correct call would have been, then they almost invariably leave the reviewing official almost
precisely in equipoise. On this view, the reviewing official will (almost) never feel prettyconfident-but-not-certain that the initial call was mistaken, in which case IVE is not merely better
than de novo, all things considered, but virtually costless. It is hard to prove or disprove this claim
without undertaking a more thorough empirical investigation. But the fact that referees so often
use up the entire reviewing time allotted them is, I think, some evidence against this skeptical
challenge—especially when the review results in a determination that the initial call “stands” (but
is not “confirmed”). See infra Section V.A. As discussed earlier, it seems likely that the referee
early on determines that the initial call was probably mistaken, and spends the remaining time
scrutinizing the frames for confirmation.
64
MLB Official Rules of Baseball, General Instructions to Umpires.
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under IVE, but each reversal is more freighted under the IVE standard than under
de novo.
Second, high epistemic standards impose significant psychological
demands on their addressees: they require people to act other than in accordance
with what they strongly believe to be true. That people will not reliably adhere to
such demanding standards is suggested by the raft of experimental evidence that
people are willing to convict even when significantly less confident of the
defendant‟s guilt than the most natural readings of the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” instruction would appear to permit.65 More to the point, most observers
would agree that football‟s own replay officials do not strictly abide by the IVE.
Take just one much-discussed example from week 15 of the 2008 season.
On the road against their hated division rivals, the Baltimore Ravens, the Steelers
were down 9-6 late in the fourth quarter, and driving. With 43 second left to play,
and on third and goal from the Ravens‟ four-yard line, a scrambling Big Ben
Roethlisberger hit Pittsburgh receiver Santonio Holmes camped on the front edge
of the end zone. Holmes clearly had both feet in the end zone as he caught the
ball with arms outstretched. But as he fell forward into the field of play, it was
unclear whether the ball ever broke the plane of the end zone. Determining that it
did not, the officials ruled Holmes down by contact just shy of the goal line. On
review, though, referee Walt Coleman reversed the on-field call, awarding the
Steelers a touchdown—and, with their 13-9 victory, the AFC North title and a
first-round playoff bye.
The reversal was, to put it mildly, controversial. Indeed, just about
everybody who weighed in thought Coleman got it wrong. Here‟s one entirely
representative objection: “there's no way that last pass to Pittsburgh Steelers wide
receiver Santonio Holmes on Sunday should have been called a touchdown by
replay. Perhaps it could have been called a touchdown live, but not by replay.
The call on the field was not an obvious mistake that needed to be corrected. It
was a close call that could have gone either way, which means the call on the field
should have stood.”66 Or, as Sports Illustrated‟s Peter King put it: “I didn't see
the indisputable visual evidence that Walt Coleman saw under the hood in
Baltimore. It was close, very close, and most likely Santonio Holmes did break

65

Some of the experimental literature is concisely summarized in Erik Lillquist,
Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 85, 112-16 (2002).
66
Patrick MacManamon, Upon Further Review, NFL Replay System, Should Go, AKRON
BEACON-JOURNAL, available at http://www.ohio.com/sports/mcmanamon/36179439.html
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the plane of the goal line in Baltimore on the biggest play of the biggest AFC
game of the weekend, but it was not indisputable.”67
I‟m a lifelong and loyal member of Steeler Nation. So it pains me to agree
with the critics. The ball might have crossed the plane in Holmes‟s possession.
Like most commentators, I do think it rather likelier than not. But indisputable?
Not by a long shot. The critics were right.68
As we have seen, some fans argue that de novo review is already the
standard actually employed no matter what the rules say. That, I have said, is an
overstatement. But it speaks to a widespread belief that the IVE isn‟t faithfully
adhered to. 69 One might reasonably surmise that these conspicuous departures
from the formal standard generate disrespect for the league and its officials if
anything does. To be sure, the NFL might have ways to promote greater
compliance with the IVE. That‟s one way to reduce the gap between what legal
theorists call “the law in the books” and “the law in action.” But here‟s another:
lower the standard.70

67

Peter King, Indisputable Evidence, Steelers continue to survive in tough games,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED,
Dec.
16,
2008,
available
at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/peter_king/12/14/Week15/index.html.
68
For my own part, I‟m more struck by what the complaints didn‟t say than what they
did. I‟ve read more than a dozen, yet haven‟t come across one that asks whether the rules make
good sense—not one that asks why, on a play on which two teams‟ playoff hopes might well rest,
officials should deploy a standard that entrenches a split-second call from a side judge stationed
some 30 yards away and partly screened by a Ravens defender, as against the call that appears
most likely to be correct after reviewing multiple camera angles in super slo-motion. Indeed,
precisely the same pattern would arise 13 months later in fans‟ reactions to the pivotal calls on the
Saints‟ final drive against the Vikings: most agree that referee Morelli was right, given the
standard of review, to let the call stand, but not one in fifty wonders why the league should
employ a standard that directed Morelli to uphold a critical call that was, most fans also think,
probably wrong.
69
See Josh Patashnik, Football, Instant Replay, and Arbitrariness, The New Republic,
Dec. 8, 2009, available at http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-plank/football-instant-replay-andarbitrariness (asserting that “most referees don‟t truly impose an indisputability standard”).
70
During the 1980s, Major League Baseball confronted a gap between the law-in-thebooks and the law-in-action of its own: umpires refused to call strikes as high as the rulebook
required. After years of unsuccessfully trying to cajole, threaten and importune the umps to call
higher strikes, MLB settled on a wise solution: it lowered the upper limit of the strike zone from
the armpits to “the midpoint between the top of the shoulders and the top of the uniform pants.”
Although this upper limit was still higher than what the umps had been calling, the league office
reasoned that if the formal rule were closer to what the implementing officials—the umpires—
liked, they‟d adhere to it even if they found it less than ideal. See Murray Chass, Baseball
Changes
the
Strike
Zone,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
8,
1987,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/08/sports/baseball-changes-the-strike-zone.html. This episode
suggests a more general lesson: when the gap between the law-in-the-books and the law-in-action
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(b) Reversals are utility-reducing on net. One theme periodically sounded
in the debate over a standard of review is that proponents of de novo review
overlook that “sports is entertainment.” One respect in which the entertainment
value of sports might be thought relevant is clear enough: as we have seen, a less
stringent standard of review might spell greater replay-associated delay, and delay
just isn‟t all that entertaining. However I believe that proponents of the objection
intend it to have force independent from and additional to the objection from
delay. The task is to unearth just what its import might be.
The central argument against IVE takes what might be termed a
competitor‟s perspective. It is not, of course, that other stakeholders are
necessarily averse to correcting officiating errors: clearly, fans vary in their taste
for this particular goal. It‟s just that the value of error-correction gains strength
from views about what those who participate in a rule-governed competition
deserve, and about the justice of arranging institutions to yield outcomes that
comport with desert. To charge proponents of de novo review with ignoring or
downplaying the entertainment value of sports is, I think, to criticize them for
overvaluing the interests of the participants—and even impersonal values like
justice—at the expense of the desires or preferences of the fans. So why, we must
ask, would the entertainment interests of fans militate against less deferential
review? This is not obvious, for proponents of the entertainment-based objection
to de novo review do not claim to have polled fans regarding which standard of
review they would prefer.
One possibility, I think, is this. Roughly, spectators of any sporting event
can be divided into two groups: those who care who wins that particular contest
(call them “partisans”) and those who don‟t (“enthusiasts”). Every call is
experienced as a benefit by some of the partisans and as a detriment by others;
some gain utility from the call, others lose it. So too with every reversal of a call
already made: to adopt a hedonic idiom, each reversal confers pleasure on
partisans of the team that benefits while inflicting pain on partisans of the team
that loses. This should be uncontroversial. But its relevance might be unclear—
unless it is to suggest that replay officials should generally respect a bias in favor
of the home team and against the visitor, or in favor of popular teams and against
the Bills and the Jaguars.
That, needless to say, is not the suggestion. The observation plausibly
becomes relevant to debates over standards of review, however, if loss aversion
and the endowment effect are true psychological phenomena. Briefly, the
endowment effect is the experimental finding that people value goods they
becomes too great, the former can lose almost all its power to influence behavior. So, perhaps
counterintuitively, a loosening of the rules might often produce a tightening of behavior.
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already own more highly than an identical good they do not own. Loss aversion
is the preferred explanation: people prefer avoiding losses to realizing gains.71 If
these cognitive biases exist and apply in this context, then partisans want not to
lose a call already made that had been to their benefit more than they want to gain
the benefit of the reversal of a call already made that had been to their detriment,
even when the magnitudes of the loss and the gain, in terms of probable impact on
contest outcome, are the same. Similarly, if the call is reversed, it is experienced
as a more profound welfare setback by partisans who lose what had been theirs
than it is experienced as a welfare gain by partisans who did not “own” the call to
begin with. If this is true, then holding all else constant (like the size of each
team‟s fan base), each reversal is utility-reducing on net. Therefore, each reversal
is a cost and, as before, the total cost of an erroneous reversal is greater than the
total cost of an erroneous affirmance.72
All of this could be; it cannot be rejected out of hand. It would
nonetheless remain to decide how to weigh this possible utility cost against the
value of correcting errors. For one thing, some behavioral psychologists and
economists question whether loss aversion and the endowment effect exist at all.
Even if they do, the circumstances that determine whether they materialize and
what their magnitudes will be are controversial. 73 More fundamentally, how
much one thinks differential partisan utility, driven by such cognitive biases as
may exist, should influence league practices at the expense of allowing more
mistaken calls to go uncorrected is likely to depend in large part on the extent to
71

See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and the Status Quo Bias, 5 J. Econ. Perspectives 193 (1991). Another cognitive bias, the omission
bias, might also be relevant. But I don‟t think that the omission bias adds anything to loss
aversion in this particular context. And because omission bias is somewhat less well understood
than is loss aversion—in particular, it is far from clear when omission bias is a genuine cognitive
bias or irrationality as opposed to a moral judgment—I focus here on loss aversion only. For a
recent discussion of omission bias, including a review of the literature, see Jonathan Baron & Ilana
Ritov, Omission Bias, Individual Differences, and Normality, 94 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Proc.
74 (2004).
72
See Patashnik, supra note 68.
73
See, e.g., Ido Erev et al., Loss Aversion, Diminishing Sensitivity, and the Effect of
Experience on Repeated Decisions, Max Wertheimer Minerva Center for Cognitive Studies,
(2008). (empirical reevaluation of test results that were explained as proof of loss aversion and
argument that these results were really a result of a diminishing sensitivity to absolute payoffs); JF
Shogren et al., Resolving Differences in the Willingness to Pay and the Willingness to Accept,
American Econ. Rev., March 1994, at 255-70 (criticizing previous tests demonstrating the
endowment effect for creating a situation of artificial scarcity and providing evidence from more
scientific tests that suggest no endowment effect). In light of uncertainty regarding the existence,
shape, and strength of the relevant phenomena, instant replay is not just an issue that settled
understandings in psychology can help address; it also provides a context in which psychological
theories can be tested and refined.

REPLAY (3/7/2011)

39

which one thinks of professional football first and foremost as sport, thus properly
governed by (among other things) norms of desert and justice, or as
entertainment, thus properly governed by norms of happiness and preferencesatisfaction.
2. The League‟s goal should be to correct errors that are not (mere)
mistakes. We have already seen the claim that it‟s misguided even to want to
eliminate officiating errors. Stated in that way, the claim is not tenable, indeed it
is silly. But precisely because it is so silly, a charitable reinterpretation is in
order. Perhaps the many people who express this view really mean to convey
something a little different. What that might be is what I aim to explore here.
Start by marking a simple division between beliefs and actions. The
officials‟ calls we have been discussing belong, let us say, to the world of beliefs,
not of actions.74 And we have been assuming that the belief is either right or
wrong (that‟s the reason for excluding “judgment calls”), and that all wrong calls
are “errors.” In other words, to say that the goal of replay review is “to improve
accuracy” or “to correct erroneous calls” is to say the very same thing. This
seems to follow unexceptionally from the dictionary definition of error as “an act,
an assertion, or a belief that unintentionally deviates from what is correct, right or
true. . . . A mistake.”75
But turn attention now to the domain of actions, and consider in particular
errors in baseball. An error is a misplaying that permits a batter or baserunner to
reach one or more additional bases than would have been allowed given “ordinary
effort” by the fielder.76 Suppose the fielder hadn‟t positioned himself well, or is a
little too slow to a batted ball, or doesn‟t put quite enough mustard on the throw.
Had he not done this thing, he would have made an out. In the event, the
baserunner is safe. Surely, we can‟t count the fielder‟s play a success. But we
74

This is a crude simplification, of course, because the official doesn‟t merely believe or
disbelieve something; he also does things, like throws a flag and makes a call. But it‟s not too
crude for our purposes: in all but the rarest cases, the action flows directly and unproblematically
from the belief—like the belief that the receiver had possession or the runner‟s knee was down.
75
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 624 (3d ed. 1992).
76
The Official Rules are not quite as clear on this point as might be hoped. Rule 10.13
provides that “An error shall be charged for each misplay (fumble, muff or wild throw) which
prologs the time at bat of a batter or which prolongs the life of a runner, or which permits a runner
to advance one or more bases,” but it does not explicitly define “misplay,” “fumble,” “muff,” or
“wild throw.” But the notes make adequately clear that not everything that falls short of the ideal
counts. Note (1) directs that “slow handling of the ball which does not involve mechanical
misplay shall not be construed as an error,” while Note (2) further explains that, while “it is not
necessary that the fielder touch the ball to be charged with an error,” the fielder‟s failure to do so
shall be charged an error only if “in the scorer‟s judgment the fielder could have handled the ball
with ordinary effort.”
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can say something stronger than that. With a little better effort or a greater
exercise of skill, he could have made an out—as is not true in the cases of nonsuccess when the fielder could not have done any better. So we can say, in cases
like these, not only that the fielder‟s play wasn‟t a success, but that it was a failure
and thus, in a sense, a mistake. Yet not all mistakes in baseball are what the sport
deems an “error.”
Following the lesson of errors in baseball, we might then distinguish two
types of errors: blunders and mere mistakes. So insofar as the goal of video replay
in sports generally, or in football particularly, is to correct officiating errors, that
statement could describe two different objectives: to correct mistake-errors or to
correct blunder-errors. The argument to this point has assumed that the goal is
mistake-correction. But perhaps it‟s blunder-correction. If mistake-correction is
the goal, then the IVE standard achieves it poorly and should be scrapped for
something like de novo review. But perhaps mistake-correction ought not to be
our ambition. Perhaps we should aim only to correct blunders-errors, not (mere)
mistake-errors. If so, de novo review might seem—at least at first blush—to have
no advantage over IVE.
Of course, it remains for defenders of IVE to explain why the goal should
be blunder-correction and not (mere) error-correction. In truth, a satisfactory
answer is not apparent to me. Nor, however, is it obvious to me that trying to
develop such an argument is futile. Therefore, to stimulate further thinking on
this topic, I‟ll mention two paths down which a proponent of the blundercorrection construal of the Pinchbeck Principle might wish to travel. Loosely, the
first path is an argument from justice, and the second an argument from virtue.
Insofar as describing these argumentative strategies as “paths” suggests that they
are alternatives to one another and thus not aggregable, one might prefer to think
of them as building blocks thus potentially combinable. Either way, I do not
claim that justice-based considerations and virtue-based ones exhaust the ways to
possibly vindicate the blunder-correction principle.
The argument from justice takes issue with my earlier comments regarding
the relationship between desert and justice. I have said (a) that competitors
deserve what their performances warrant as measured against the rules of their
sport, and (b) that justice consists of giving competitors what they deserve. A
justice-based argument for blunder-correction over mistake-correction could
challenge either of these claims.
Start with a challenge to proposition (a). The rules I have in mind are the
rules that govern play and are addressed to the players, not the rules that govern
adjudication and are addressed to the officials—the conduct rules” (or “primary
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rules”), not the “decision rules” (or “secondary rules”).77 Here‟s an example that
will make clearer the distinction I‟m drawing. Suppose a wide receiver catches a
pass in bounds for a ten-yard gain. Suppose also, however, that the officials
determine, incorrectly but reasonably, that the receiver did not have possession. I
have assumed that the offense deserves a first down because it has in fact moved
the ball ten yards downfield and the rules governing play—the rules addressed to
the competitors—provide that a ten-yard gain earns a first down. An alternative
view would hold that the rules addressed to the officials must be consulted in
order to determine what the participants deserve. If players deserve the outcome
that accords with the instructions given the officials—instructions that are
sensitive to what the officials believe transpired—then the offense does not
deserve a first down if what the official is supposed to do given that he believes
the pass was not cleanly caught is to rule the pass incomplete. This view strikes
me as significantly less plausible than the first, but not crazy on its face.
A somewhat more promising road is to acknowledge that desert is
measured by the conduct rules, but to deny that justice consists of arranging
outcomes to accord with desert—it is to accept claim (a), but to challenge claim
(b). It does so by exploiting a possible distinction between desert and entitlement
such that the obligations of officials are taken into account not when determining
what players deserve but only when determining what they are entitled to.
Switching sports, suppose that the next pitch on a 3-2 count passes through the
strike zone and is taken by the batter, but that the umpire mistakenly believes that
the pitch was high or outside. On the view that I have favored, the pitcher
deserves to be credited with a strikeout. Very possibly, though, he is not entitled
to such a call. If this is right, then the important question becomes whether justice
in an institutional setting consists of giving participants what they deserve or what
they are entitled to. If the latter, then the idea that sports should be concerned
with blunder-correction and not with mistake-correction might get off the ground
if players are entitled to blunder-free officiating but not mistake-free officiating.
Obviously, many dots will have to be connected to make this argument go. My
aim now is only to gesture toward a possible argument not to fully sketch it out,
let alone to defend it.
The second route or building block might draw from George Will‟s notion
that an officiating error is not a “blemish to be expunged.” Because mistake-errors
are ineliminable, the argument might go, the desire to correct them reflects an
unattractive instinct—perhaps even a vice of some sort. Somewhat similarly, one
might worry that a reversal implies that the call being reversed fell short of what
77

On conduct rules and decision rules, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984). On primary rules
and secondary rules, see Hart, supra note 7, at 79-91.
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was reasonably expected of the on-field official, and therefore that reversal
reinforces a general social tendency for people to develop unrealistic expectations
of themselves and others, which expectations undermine self-esteem and impede
formation of rewarding interpersonal relationships. (A loose analogy might be
drawn here to the deleterious impact that Barbie Dolls and GI Joes have on body
image.) Consequently, resisting the impulse to correct mere mistakes builds
character.
Frankly, I find none of this compelling. To try to correct mistakes that are
correctible need not, it seems to me, either issue from or reinforce a childish and
unrealistic belief in the prospects for human perfection. But others might think
that these brief and telegraphic thoughts hold greater promise. Again, my goal
here is only to gesture toward the sorts of ideas that, if refined and elaborated
upon, might possibly serve as building blocks in support of the proposition that
sports leagues should be more concerned with correcting blunder-errors and less
concerned—or unconcerned—with correcting (mere) mistake errors. If that
proposition can be vindicated, it is not hard to imagine the rest of the argument
that would yield a conclusion in favor of highly deferential review.
D. Summary
Readers who had hoped that this Part would reach a confident conclusion
regarding the single optimal standard of review for the NFL are apt now to be
disappointed, for I have concluded that there remains room for reasonable
disagreement regarding critical empirical and evaluative premises. In fairness,
though, to have expected much more at this time was unrealistic. Before
resolving a problem, you must first get a clear handle on the fruitful ways to think
about it; you must identify and map out the possibly promising arguments and
argumentative paths. When addressing already identified problems in mature
fields, we find that much of the necessary cartographic work has already been
accomplished. Not so in the case of instant replay‟s standard of review, a subject
on which there is virtually no serious scholarly work. The same observation holds
true, of course, across wide swaths of the jurisprudence of sport, which is what
makes it such a promising and exciting field of scholarly inquiry.
That said, several conclusions appear warranted.
First, there is a powerful prima facie argument against IVE: (1) The
reason to institute instant replay review in the first place is to correct
(consequential) officiating mistakes. (2) All (final) errors are bad because they fail
to award competitors the outcome they deserve in virtue of their performance. (3)
Final errors produced by mistakenly reversing a correct call are not, as a class,
any worse or better, in the currency of what makes an erroneous call bad, than
final errors arrived at by mistakenly affirming an incorrect call. (4) Generally
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speaking, the reviewing referee, deciding with the benefit of advanced video
technology, is better able to make the correct call than are the on-field officials
who have to make an initial call from a single vantage point at game speed. (5)
Therefore, de novo review would better serve the value that instant replay is
designed to serve than does a standard, like IVE, that entrenches initial calls
against reversal.
Second, the most-often advanced arguments against a less deferential
standard of review, like de novo, are unpersuasive: (6) Instant replay can be
implemented to produce about the same amount of delay regardless of the
standard of review. (7) It seems unlikely that a system of de novo review would
diminish respect for officials any more than IVE does; indeed, the converse
hypothesis seems at least as likely to be true.
Third and nonetheless, it would be premature to conclude that a nondeferential standard of review is optimal, all things considered. Perhaps the most
promising route toward vindicating the IVE depends upon demonstrating that,
after play has already been stopped to permit review, it is worse to reverse an
initially correct on-field call than to permit to stand an initially incorrect on-field
call. This would be consistent with proposition (3) above if the fact of reversal
were itself a cost. Although arguments designed to show that “erroneous
reversals” are worse or more costly than “erroneous affirmances” have not been
well developed, we have uncovered at least one possible path toward such a
conclusion: (8) Regardless of whether it corrects an officiating mistake or creates
a new one, every reversal conceivably makes sports less entertaining, or reduces
the pleasure and satisfaction of the spectators, because the transfer of the call
reduces the utility of the losers more than it increases the utility of the winners, all
else equal. Additionally or alternatively, (9) the NFL‟s interest in correcting
errors might be better conceived as an interest in correcting blunders than mere
mistakes. While I am not myself much tempted by propositions (8) or (9), it
would be premature to dismiss them. And thinking them through will require
attention to, among other things: the dual character of spectator sports as both
athletic contests and as popular entertainment; tradeoffs between satisfying
preferences (or increasing welfare) and promoting justice; the constituents of
desert and entitlement, and the relationship of each to justice and injustice; the
operation of cognitive biases like loss aversion; the virtues and vices of
endeavoring to correct human errors that are not also human blunders. These are
rich and complex issues, of broad jurisprudential interest.
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IV. THREE EASY FIXES
Given the inconclusive conclusion to Part III, the reader would be forgiven
for thinking that we can say nothing more than: maybe the NFL should keep IVE,
maybe it should lower the standard to de novo, depending on where you come
down on the factors that I have agreed to be reasonably disputable. To the
contrary, I will argue here that the NFL should change its system no matter
what—but that different changes would be appropriate on different assumptions.
A. Proposal 1: Correcting Mistake-Errors
Persons who believe that the purpose of instituting instant replay should
be to correct officiating mistakes at acceptable cost will be drawn to a lower
standard of review that does a better job at mistake-correction. Probably the most
obvious upshot of the foregoing analysis is that football‟s indisputable visual
evidence standard of review should be scrapped and replaced with de novo
review.78 That‟s not a bad idea. But were the league to embrace de novo review,
it could implement it in a manner that would promise even greater overall
accuracy and faster review.
As the French philosopher the Marquis de Condorcet established over two
hundred years ago, if individuals are even slightly more likely to answer a given
question correctly than incorrectly, then increasing the number of decision makers
and resolving the question by majority vote will increase the likelihood of getting
the right answer. Given Condorcet‟s “Jury Theorem,” and indulging the
uncontroversial assumption that replay officials‟ de novo calls of on-field plays
are more likely to be right than wrong, then resolving reviewed calls by involving
some odd number of replay officials greater than one and aggregating their
judgments will prove more accurate than leaving review in the hands of a single
official.
So here‟s a concrete proposal: the NFL should set up a special video
review operation in a centralized location and staff it with some modest number
of trained video replay officials. Whenever a challenge arises, ad hoc panels of,
say, three or five officials (or whatever number cost considerations permit) would
be drawn at random from the larger pool to review all the video evidence from the
78

To reiterate a point made earlier: de novo review would not render the initial call
wholly unprivileged. The on-field would be “sticky” for at least two reasons. First, the burden of
persuasion would rest on the challenger, so that if the reviewing official concludes that the initial
call is as likely to have been right as wrong, the initial call stands. Second, the reviewing official
might even take the initial on-field call as evidence in favor of the facts that would support it.
When the on-field official was in a position to see the play from an angle that the cameras missed,
the reviewer might reasonably infer the reason the on-field official made the call he did was
because that‟s how things did in fact appear.
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several stadium cameras much as the referee does on-site under the present
system. Without deliberating, each official would register his own de novo
judgment regarding what the call should be, and the final call would be whatever
the majority “vote” established.79 Because, in addition to exploiting Condorcet‟s
insight, this system would also take advantage of the greater expertise of officials
specially trained in this single task, review should be more accurate as well as
faster. And it would protect against a single corrupt referee even better than does
the IVE.
B. Proposal 2: Correcting Blunder-Errors
The first proposal assumed that the goal of instant replay is to improve
accuracy or, synonymously, to correct mistake-errors. Persons who conclude that
the league should strive only to correct blunder-errors are right to disfavor de
novo review. But here‟s the interesting thing: the IVE standard still wouldn‟t be
sensible—not because it‟s too deferential to the initial call, but because it‟s not
deferential enough! Because we can reasonably expect officials to be only as
good as the visual apparatus with which nature has equipped them (subject to
modest enhancement, where necessary), after-the-fact high definition, super slomo, multi-angle replay can disclose that the decision was indisputably
substantively mistaken, even when the on-field official didn‟t blunder.
To appreciate how this could be let‟s take a second and even more famous
balletic reception by the Steelers‟ Santonio Holmes: his fully-extended grab of
Roethlisberger‟s high dart in the rear corner of the end zone to defeat the Arizona
Cardinals in Super Bowl XLIII. As the nearly 100 million Americans who
watched the contest know, although it appeared, both live and on replays, that the
toes of Holmes‟s right foot did touch the ground after he secured possession of the
football, the video evidence remains something short of conclusive. Suppose now
that NBC had used better video technology and that this improved system
revealed—indisputably!—that Holmes‟s toe had lifted off the turf just a fraction
of an inch before he secured possession of the football. 80 In that event, we‟d
know that the call on the field was mistaken. But it still wouldn‟t have been an
error: Given the speed of the play, we could not reasonably have expected the
official to have gotten it right; he is not fairly criticized for having gotten it
wrong.
79

Supermajority voting rules could be used instead, though this would yield more final
errors than would a bare majority rule. A compromise would be to constitute reviewing panels
with an even number of members and uphold the initial call if the panel is equally divided.
80
One commentator has claimed that the video technology “used at the Beijing Olympics
. . . blows away anything in use in the NFL.” Paula Duffy, Santonio Holmes Catch Still Under
Review, Examiner.com, Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://www.examiner.com/x-426-SportsExaminer~y2009m2d4-Santonio-Holmes-catch-still-under-review.
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If the purpose of review were reconceptualized as blunder-correction not
mistake-correction, it would remain to determine what standard of review should
be applied to determine whether the call was an error in this more limited sense—
a decision that an official exercising ordinary (professional) perception and
judgment, having assumed his proper place on the field of play, would not have
made. I have no strong views on this score. Perhaps it would be enough to
instruct the reviewing referee to overturn what Little League Baseball calls
“obvious wrongs”—obvious to spectators in real time, and not just obvious on
review. Perhaps this is also what Australian cricket captain Ricky Ponting was
thinking when observing, after instant replay was introduced to test cricket just
this past year, that “we shouldn't expect every decision to be perfect. What we're
after is to eradicate the really bad decisions.”81
Whatever the exact reviewing standard might be, the critical insight is that
if our goal is to correct “really bad decisions”—what I am calling blunder-errors
in contradistinction to mistake-errors—then the use of multiple-angle super slomo high definition video in replay might be fundamentally misguided. Think
about more notorious officiating blunders: Vinnie Testaverde‟s phantom
touchdown against the Seahawks, or baseball umpire Phil Cuzzi‟s bizarre foul call
on Joe Mauer‟s opposite-field fly in the 2009 American League Playoffs. What
make calls like these “really bad decisions” is that their wrongness is evident even
to the naked eye. If the NFL‟s goal should be, not to make sure that the call was
right, but only that it wasn‟t a blunder, review should be quicker and more
perfunctory.
C. Proposal 3: That‟s Entertainment
A third perspective takes very seriously the idea that partisans who lose
when a call is reversed feel the sting more sharply than the partisans who gain
from the reversal enjoy the windfall. Some advocates of this entertainmentoriented perspective might think the disparity is so great as to make the use of
instant replay a bad buy overall. Others accept instant replay so long as the
losers‟ sense of loss and aggrievedness can be reduced within acceptable bounds.
A highly deferential standard of review serves this interest by prohibiting reversal
except in those circumstances in which even the partisans (fans and players) who
lose from reversal can be expected to agree that the initial call was mistaken. 82
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Graeme Smith says Test cricket referral system is half-hearted, THE AUSTRALIAN, Mar.
3,
2009,
available
at
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,251321625001505,00.html.
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Readers who would defend the IVE might nonetheless enjoy this chestnut. Although
the NFL rules rarely specify the standard of proof required for an on-field call, they sometimes do.
For example, they specify a standard for receptions: if there is any doubt that the receiver made a
valid reception, the pass must be ruled incomplete. NFL Rule 8, Sec. 1, Art. 6. So we can combine
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That, I suspect, is the best rationale for IVE. However even if IVE ought to be
preserved for this reason (or for others), three modest changes would reduce the
injustice that such a demanding standard tolerates relative to a less deferential
standard.
First, a team that succeeds on its challenges should get an additional
challenge until it fails. Under existing rules, a team is allowed a third challenge if
its first two succeed, but gets no more even if the third succeeds too. This rule is
hard to justify. A challenge succeeds under IVE only if the referee has concluded
that the call was indisputably mistaken. If a team has earned three reversals, the
officials have made at least three indisputably wrong calls to that team‟s
detriment. It seems unfair that the fact that the officiating crew had already erred
so much should serve to render a team unprotected against a subsequent
officiating blunder. Compare: voir dire rules do not limit a party‟s challenges for
cause. That the defendant has already successfully challenged three members of
the jury panel who were related to the plaintiff is no reason to bar her from
successfully challenging the plaintiff‟s brother too.
In theory, this change could increase delay, though the actual impact
would be trivial. A variant that probably would have a more than de minimis
effect on replay-related delay would be to restore a challenge when it succeeds.
That is, each coach could be granted, not two opportunities to challenge a call, but
two failed challenges. This, as I say, probably would increase delays. But it
wouldn‟t increase net delay if paired with another reform that deserves serious
attention on its own: eliminate booth review in the final two minutes of each half.
As Tony Dungy has recognized, 83 booth reviews slow the game at its most
exciting juncture yet catch, and thus reverse, indisputably incorrect calls at a
much lower rate than do coaches‟ challenges. 84 The NFL could speed up the
game by placing all power to initiate review in the coaches‟ hands, while
mitigating the impact on a coach by allowing him to challenge as many calls as
he‟d like until he fails twice or runs out of timeouts.
that standard of proof with the indisputable-visual-evidence standard of review to produce a nice
question: if the ruling on the field is “complete,” what must the replay official determine in order
to overrule that call: (a) that there is indisputable visual evidence that the pass was incomplete, or
(b) that there is indisputable visual evidence that it is not certain that the pass was
complete? Imagine, for instance, that the camera shows only the back of the receiver as he goes
out of bounds and it is impossible to tell from that angle whether he had full possession of the ball
before he left the field of play, and that the official who called the pass complete was standing
next to the camera, making it (arguably) indisputable that he could not have discerned with
certainty that the pass was complete. What is the correct call on review?
83
See John Clayton, Dungy Wants Changes to Replay System, ESPN, Dec. 15, 2002,
available at http://a.espncdn.com/nfl/columns/clayton_john/1476343.html.
84
See supra note 40.
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Third and most radically, the NFL should explore the possibility of
delimiting circumstances in which instant replay could be used to determine the
initial call, and not just to review a call already made. The strongest case for use
of replay to make the first call is on “pivotal” or “outcome-affecting” plays when
the on-field officials are not confident of the correct call. Consider a pass to the
end zone in the final two minutes of a close game in which, even after
deliberation, the officials are uncertain whether the receiver secured possession in
bounds. Sure, we‟d prefer them to be confident, but they just might not be. One
thing the referee can be confident of, though, is that whatever call he makes will
be reviewed—either at the instigation of the replay official or (if booth reviews
are eliminated) by the disappointed coach. Under such circumstances—and I do
not think they are terribly rare—IVE seems to work particular unfairness. There
is no good reason to forcefully entrench an initial and plainly consequential call
that the on-field officials know is little more than guesswork. Rugby league and
rugby union both allow match officials to defer a call on tries (scoring chances) to
the replay official.85 In short, instant replay could be used not only to review onfield calls but also—if very occasionally—to make calls in the first instance.
When used in this latter manner, review must, of course, be non-deferential, and
the reviewing official can be freed to reach the decision most likely to be
accurate. That‟s an alternative well worth considering by any system of instant
replay that otherwise employs a highly deferential standard of review.
V. YES, NO, AND MAYBE: THE THREE-VERDICT SYSTEM
A. Instant replay in the NCAA
The NFL had experimented with video replay as early as 1986 and the
system in place today dates, with revisions, back to 1999. College football,
however, did not enter the replay age until the Big Ten deployed it on a trial basis
in 2004. Most major conferences followed the next year and, in 2006, the NCAA
enacted rules governing the use of video replay to review on-field calls. The
individual conferences decide whether to use video replay but, if they choose to,
they must abide by the NCAA rules.
The NCAA and NFL systems differ in detail. For example, while each
coach is entitled to one challenge per game (a second if the first is successful),
review in the NCAA is ordinarily initiated by a designated replay official. Also,
not all the calls reviewable in the NFL are also reviewable in college football. For
85

See Laws of the Rugby Union 2010, International Rugby Board, at 43, (2010).
Somewhat farther afield, when a court determines that some other court (say, a higher court or the
court of another jurisdiction) is better equipped to resolve a novel question of law, it is often
authorized to certify that question to that other court for initial resolution.
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the most part, though, the NCAA replay rules track their NFL counterparts. For
purposes of this chapter, it is enough to note one fundamental similarity and one
intriguing difference.
The core similarity is that the NCAA essentially parrots the NFL standard
of review, directing that “to reverse an on-field ruling, the replay official must be
convinced beyond all doubt by indisputable visual evidence through one or more
video replays provided to the monitor.”86 Moreover, while the NCAA has recently
reiterated its commitment to this standard, it has done no better than its
professional counterparts in providing a persuasive rationale. 87 In short, the
NCAA sits pretty much where the NFL does: with an extraordinarily demanding
standard of review and no clear articulation of the considerations or values that
might support it—which is to say, no good reasons why, once video replay has
been instituted, we should design it to ensure that so many wrong calls will be
allowed to stand. Indeed, that the NCAA could plausibly invoke any such reasons
is marginally less likely than for its professional cousin. We saw that one
possible (if not especially convincing) rationale for the indisputable video
evidence standard in the NFL is to reduce delay, mostly by discouraging head
coaches from challenging calls in the first place. But that rationale isn‟t available
86

Rule 7, section 7. I do not know why it substitutes “video” for “visual.”
In 2009 the rules committee inserted a new statement of “philosophy” to the replay
rules. Codified at section 1 of Rule 12, this statement provides:
The instant replay process operates under the fundamental assumption that the
ruling on the field is correct. The replay official may reverse a ruling if and only if the
video evidence convinces him beyond all doubt that the ruling was incorrect. Without
such indisputable video evidence, the replay official must allow the ruling to stand.
Notice to start that the second and third sentences are simply directives—indeed, they
aren‟t even two different directives but merely rephrasings of the very same one. So if the
statement contains any defense of the standard it‟s in the first sentence. No doubt the rules
committee is fully warranted in assuming that the ruling on the field is correct. Without any such
assumption, it might be hard to explain why the game is not stopped to permit careful review of
each play as a matter of course. That would be folly. So although “the replay official and his crew
shall review every play of a game,” he is sensibly instructed not to stop the game unless he
believes “that there is reasonable evidence to believe an error was made in the initial on-field
ruling” (and then only if he believes that “the outcome of a review would have a direct,
competitive impact on the game”). But assumptions aren‟t the conclusions to rigorous argument
or searching inquiry. They‟re starting points. As such, they are frequently mistaken—more often
(we hope) right, but often enough wrong. If the video evidence leaves the replay official with a
high degree of confidence—albeit short of certainty—that the on-field ruling was incorrect, then
the natural thing to say is that the assumption is defeated or overcome. After all, that assumptions
can be overcome is part of their nature as starting points for argument or action, and not as axioms
or postulates. So the committee‟s statement of philosophy doesn‟t explain what allows us to travel
from the entirely reasonable “fundamental assumption that the ruling on the field is correct” to the
directive that it must be upheld when evidence strongly suggests, but does not conclusively
establish, that, in this particular case, it wasn‟t.
87
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to the NCAA, where review is ordinarily initiated at the discretion of the replay
official himself who may stop the game to review an unlimited number of calls
and who suffers under no time limits when he does initiate a review.88
So much for fundamental similarity. Now for the intriguing difference.
The Official NFL Rules specify how certain the replay official must be before
reversing an on-field call. But they don‟t dictate precisely what he must say. The
NCAA does. If the official is sufficiently convinced (that is, convinced beyond
all doubt by indisputable visual evidence) that the on-field ruling was erroneous,
he must reverse the call. In doing so, he must announce what the new ruling is
and specify what consequences follow. That‟s all straightforward enough. But
what if the official is not convinced that the initial ruling was wrong? The
rulebook recognizes two possibilities:
“1. If the video evidence confirms the on-field ruling,” then the
official is directed to announce: “After further review, the ruling on the
field is confirmed.”
“2. If there is no indisputable (conclusive) evidence to reverse the
on-field ruling,” the official must announce: “After further view, the ruling
on the field stands.”
Here, finally, is the point of interest. The two announcements—I will call
them two different “verdicts”—have the same concrete consequence. Whether
the replay official is persuaded that the on-field ruling was correct or merely not
persuaded beyond all doubt that it was wrong, the on-field ruling stands.89 So
why bother to distinguish the two cases? Why isn‟t it enough just to announce
either that the call stands or that it is reversed?
I don‟t present this question as a “puzzle.” That‟s because the answer
seems fairly obvious. Although the first verdict—that the ruling “is confirmed”—
and the second—that it (merely) “stands”—have the same tangible effects, they
plainly differ in what we might term “expressive significance.” The stoppage of
play and initiation of formal review broadcast doubt about the on-field official‟s
decision. The first ruling announces to the multitude: “he got it right”; the
second says only “well, I can‟t say that he got it wrong.” Verdict (2), to be sure,
releases the referee from liability. But verdict (1) does more: it releases him from
liability and vindicates him as well.
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2009-2010 NCAA Rules and Interpretations, Rule 12, Sec. 6, Art. 2, at FR-146.
An aside: the rules don‟t specify what it means for the video evidence to “confirm” the
on-field ruling. In particular, it is unclear whether the evidence must conclusively establish that
ruling‟s correctness, or if it is enough that the evidence leaves the replay official persuaded that
the initial call was more likely than not correct.
89
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Now, we shouldn‟t overdramatize. The officials sometimes get it wrong.
They know it, we know it, and they know that we know it. They strive to do the
best they can (and it‟s a tribute to their ability and training that they get the close
calls right as often as they do), but they know that the best they can do is still well
short of perfection. So I don‟t imagine that the prospect of receiving something
less than explicit and unequivocal public recognition that he made the right call
causes the ordinary official much anxiety—even if, in a different cultural context,
things could be very different. (It might be different in sumo, for example. To
this day, the ring referee, the gyoji, carries a dagger as a symbol of his authority.
Centuries ago, the dagger served a more practical function: a gyoji who erred was
expected to disembowel himself.)90
Still that extra public affirmation (“he got it right”) isn‟t nothing—it isn‟t
nothing for the official himself and it isn‟t nothing for the entity that employs and
trains him. At least that‟s what one might reasonably have surmised in the
absence of evidence one way or another. However, the very existence of the
NCAA three-verdict system—(1) confirmed, (2) stands, and (3) reversed—is
powerful supporting evidence. That the NCAA bothers to instruct its replay
officials to distinguish between two judgments even when, in one sense, the
difference doesn‟t matter, tells us that, in another sense, it must.
Turns out that it matters in the NFL too. Although the official rulebook
itself doesn‟t distinguish between the two types of affirmance, actual practice on
the pro level has in recent years started to track the collegiate example.
Sometimes when affirming the on-field call, the referee will specify in some
detail just what the video reveals. Other times, he will favor the audience only
with the terse “after further review, the ruling on the field stands.” It stands, but it
isn‟t confirmed—a distinction that several broadcast announcers have increasingly
emphasized.91
B. From the Gridiron to the Courtroom
Much of this essay has been designed to show that tools and analysis
developed in the law can be of help to sports leagues by helping them to more
sensitively evaluate the costs and benefits of different systems of instant replay
review. Now I want to argue that football can return the favor. For a moment‟s
90

JAPAN: TRUE STORIES OF LIFE ON THE ROAD, 39 (Donald George & Amy Carlson eds.

1999).
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In 2009, the league office revised its official referees‟ manual to validate this practice.
See 2009 National Football League Referees‟ Manual 52-53 (“If you confirm or reverse the ruling
on the field, explain the reason why. The explanation should be short and to the point. The only
time you should announce „the ruling on the field stands‟ is when there is not enough visual
evidence to make a decision. However, do not say the play or ruling is „confirmed‟ or
„reversed‟.”).
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reflection should reveal that a system of three rather than two verdicts has no
particular or unique linkage to instant replay or to football or to sports more
generally. To the contrary, a three-verdict system is at least an option anytime a
decision procedure employs a standard of proof (or of review) more demanding
than the default more-likely-than-not standard.92 And the longest standing, most
widespread, and most familiar such decision procedure is found, not in football,
but in law. It is criminal law‟s “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof.
As we have seen, that standard requires that if the jury is persuaded of the
defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, they must convict. If the jury is not
so persuaded, they must acquit, and the state may not retry the defendant on the
same charges. In the latter case, the formal verdict is “not guilty.” But that‟s a
famous misnomer. It does not mean “We believe that the defendant is not guilty”
but rather “We believe that the state has failed to prove the defendant‟s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Here, then, is the question: Why just two verdicts? Why not three? If we
think it‟s desirable to distinguish the two different bases for affirming an official‟s
call in football, why isn‟t it also desirable to distinguish the two different bases
for acquitting a defendant in a criminal trial? The state could permit (or require)
the jury to select between two different forms of acquittal: “not guilty” (or
“innocent”) when they are persuaded that the defendant is not, in fact, guilty; and
“not proven guilty” when they believe that the defendant is guilty more likely
than not, but are left with too much doubt to convict. Why shouldn‟t we?
Many readers, I suspect, will have the immediate intuitive reaction that the
football case and the criminal case are really quite different, that although a threeverdict review system makes good sense when instant replay is involved, we are
better off with the existing two-verdict system in criminal law. That could be the
right answer. But we‟d do well not to invest too much confidence in that initial
intuition or reaction, even if strongly felt. One of the most stable and robust
findings in social science concerns what psychologists and economists call the
status quo bias: a cognitive bias that disposes us to prefer the way things are, and
to assume more strongly than the evidence would justify that the way things are is
supported by sound reason. So you might be drawn to the two-verdict system
because there are good reasons for it, or you might be drawn to it because that‟s
the way things are.93
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Strictly speaking, a three-verdict system is possible even under the preponderance
standard, for a separate verdict could apply when the factfinder is precisely in equipoise. But this
is trivial: by this reasoning, football‟s two separate standards of proof could support five verdicts.
93
Plausibly, the status quo bias could also explain some or much of the resistance to a
lower standard of review for instant replay in football.
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Well, that‟s not the way things are everywhere. Not in Scotland, for
example. Although part of the United Kingdom, Scots law is its own legal
system, tracing back to Roman law and today containing elements of English
common law and the continental civil law tradition. Among the more distinctive
features of Scottish criminal law is the availability of three verdicts. As in
English criminal law, Scottish judges and juries are required to convict a
defendant if persuaded of his guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” In that case, the
verdict is “guilty.” But if not so persuaded, the factfinder must return either one
of two verdicts: “not guilty” or “not proven.” Orthodox understanding has it that
the former expresses a judgment “that the accused definitely did not commit the
crime with which he is charged,” whereas the latter “means merely that the judge
or jury has reasonable doubt as to the accused‟s guilt.” 94 So instead of blithely
accepting that American criminal law is as it ought to be, it‟s well worth trying
carefully to identify, and evaluate, the costs and benefits of introducing a third
verdict.95
1. Expressive winners and losers. For ease of discussion, let‟s agree on
some terms. Under either system, a jury would be instructed to return a verdict of
“guilty”—that is, to convict—whenever persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt of
the defendant‟s guilt. The present verdict that encompasses all acquittals, not
distinguishing among them, is, as we know, “not guilty.” Let‟s hypothesize a new
acquittal of “innocent” for cases when the factfinder believes that, more likely
than not, the accused is innocent of the charges;96 and a new acquittal of “not
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Peter Duff, The Not Proven Verdict: Jury Mythology and “Moral Panics,” 1996 Jurid.

Rev. 1, 6.
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In recent years, American legal journals have seen two proposals for reform along
these lines. See Samuel Bray, Comment, Not Proven: Introducing a Third Verdict, 72 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1299 (2005); Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1297 (2000). And for a more radical reform proposal driven by a concern that jury
verdicts should send clear and nuanced messages, see Paul H. Robinson, STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW (1997). You might think that the issue would have been mooted
more exhaustively in the English legal literature given the greater salience to English lawyers and
scholars of the Scottish experience. Not so. When I expressed my surprise at the dearth of
English literature on the subject to John Gardner, the Glasgow-born Professor of Jurisprudence at
Oxford, he had a ready explanation: “The quickest way to ensure that the English don‟t do
something is to tell them that‟s the way it‟s done in Scotland.”
96
A defendant could be innocent for all sorts of reasons: because he had nothing at all to
do with the crime charged, as in cases of mistaken identity; or because he committed the actions
but lacked the criminal mental state, as in cases of accident or mistake; or because he had a valid
defense, like self-defense, and so on. Let‟s put these variations aside for now. If any of these
circumstances obtain, the defendant has not committed a criminal offense.
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proven” when the factfinder believes it more likely that the accused is guilty, but
has “reasonable doubts” that preclude conviction.97 (See Table)

Confidence in Guilt 2-verdict system
Guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt
More likely than not
Guilty, but not
beyond a reasonable
doubt
More likely than not
Innocent

Guilty

3-verdict system

Consequence

Guilty

Convicted

Not proven

Acquitted

Innocent

Acquitted

Not Guilty

One might suppose at first blush that a choice between the two systems
would not affect the conviction rate. So long as the standard of proof that the
state must satisfy to win a conviction remains unchanged, then the same
defendants destined to be convicted under a two-verdict system should be
convicted under a three-verdict system, and vice versa. The only defendants who
would be affected by a choice between the systems would be those who are
acquitted. (These are the folks who find themselves in the shaded boxes in
Table.) And it should be clear which of those defendants win and which lose.
Those defendants who are awarded the new more favorable “innocent” acquittal
would be winners: the verdict of “innocence” signals the jurors‟ belief that the
defendant was more likely than not innocent, a message that the jurors would
97

Of course, we needn‟t stop at three verdicts. We could attach a different verdict to
each of several different confidence judgments: “innocent” for when the jury thinks the accused is
innocent beyond a reasonable doubt; “not guilty” when the jury believes he‟s innocent more likely
than not; “not proven” when they think he‟s probably guilty; and “guilty” when they‟re persuaded
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have been unable to communicate in the two-verdict system. Those acquitted
defendants who are adjudged “not proven” would be losers, for onlookers will
know that these defendants could have been granted the more desirable
“innocent” acquittal, and weren‟t.
Presumably, the losers will outnumber the winners. (There will be more
individuals in the “Not proven” cell than in the “Innocent” cell.) Nobody finds
himself in the dock unless several actors in the system, each of whom could have
done otherwise, elected to proceed: the police might not have arrested him, the
prosecutor might have chosen not to charge him, a grand jury might have refused
to indict. Admittedly, these aren‟t all the most robust protections: defense
attorneys quip that a grand jury will indict a ham sandwich. But they probably do
serve to ensure that there‟s a genuine case against the overwhelming majority of
defendants who reach trial. And trial outcomes seem to bear this out: the
conviction rate across American jurisdictions—putting plea bargains entirely to
the side—hovers around 80% in state cases and 90% in federal prosecutions.98
Given the several veto gates through which a criminal defendant must pass before
reaching a jury, it seems doubtful that the majority of jurors who do vote to acquit
believe, not merely that there remains reasonable doubt of the accused‟s guilt, but
that he is more likely than not to be innocent. If we‟re just counting noses, the
status quo might appear preferable.
But should we just count noses? We should if the magnitudes of the gains
and losses are equal, if what each loser loses is as great as what each winner wins.
In fact, though, that assumption seems highly improbable. As one scholar has
wryly observed: “For an innocent suspect charged with a crime, there are only
two possible outcomes: bad and really bad.”99 The better outcome—acquittal—is
still bad because of the burdens and anxiety of mounting a defense to criminal
prosecution and also because of the reality that acquittals rarely erase all doubts
about the defendant‟s innocence that the facts of arrest and prosecution raise.
You might be acquitted, but don‟t expect all your coworkers, distant relatives, and
former high school classmates no longer to suspect that you‟re guilty. To be sure,
even the more robust acquittal associated with a verdict of innocence would not
eliminate all skepticism. But it should go a long way. This is an invaluable
benefit to those who secure it. And not only to them: on the assumption that more
information is generally better than less, because a two-tiered acquittal system

98

See Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, p.3 (April 2008, NCJ 221152) (reporting that,
in the nation‟s 75 most populous counties, 79% of trials in 2004 resulted in conviction). Federal
prosecutors do even better than their state counterparts, securing convictions in 90% of the
prosecutions they bring to trial. Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2004, Table 4.2.
99
Leipold, supra note 94, at 1301.

REPLAY (3/7/2011)

56

conveys more nuanced information than does the current single-tier system,
society at large benefits as well.
Importantly, the very thing that renders the award of an innocent verdict
so valuable to those who receive it—the fact that, under the present two-verdict
system, so many observers think that acquitted defendants are probably guilty—
also reduces the sting of a “not proven” verdict. Sure, defendants who get only
the “not proven” acquittal in a three-verdict system are likely to be thought guilty
by many. But the same is true if they had been acquitted as “not guilty” under a
two-verdict system. In short, the gain to each of the (relatively fewer) winners is
likely to be considerably greater than the loss to each of the (relatively more
numerous) losers. Therefore, the aggregate gain might well outweigh the
aggregate loss. Besides, the fact that the intermediate verdict in a three-verdict
system has somewhat more sting than acquittal in a two-verdict system isn‟t all
bad. Most of the folks awarded a “not proven” acquittal would in fact be guilty,
so perhaps fully deserve a little stigma even if we demand greater confidence to
formally convict and to punish.100
That last suggestion will strike some readers as harsh, and inconsistent
with the presumption of innocence. Harsh, maybe. But not, I think, contrary to
our vaunted presumption. The simple fact is that the presumption of innocence,
though familiar and high-sounding, does not alone mean terribly much.101 All it
does is assign the burden of proof to the prosecution. It doesn‟t even say anything
about what the standard of proof must be. Permitting convictions so long as the
state proves the defendant‟s guilt “more likely than not” is fully consistent with
the presumption of innocence. To be sure, such a practice would not be consistent
with the common law tradition, nor is it constitutionally permissible given
Supreme Court precedent. But it‟s not the presumption of innocence that rules
this out, it‟s the understanding that due process precludes conviction unless the
state proves each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. So I‟m going
to revise what I said above. What the presumption of innocence adds to the legal
rule that the prosecution must prove each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt is almost nothing. All it does—and it may not even be needed
for this—is to make clear that the evidence on which the prosecution may rely is
limited to what it brings forth during the criminal trial: the fact finder may not
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speed the prosecution along, as it were, by treating the fact of the indictment itself
as some evidence of the defendant‟s guilt.
The Scottish rule precludes conviction unless the prosecution proves all
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore consistent with
the presumption of innocence. Now, you might say that it is inconsistent with the
spirit of the presumption—or, better, with the spirit of the beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard of proof—to allow adverse consequences short of conviction to
attach unless the evidence supports a conviction. But that‟s not
plausible. Consider that criminal defendants can be held without bail. That one
fact alone demonstrates the falsity of the bromide that “it is a cornerstone of our
system that defendant is considered innocent until proven guilty.” Surely it
wouldn‟t be kosher to lock up folks we consider innocent. Rather, it is a
cornerstone of our system that nobody be convicted of a crime and subject to
criminal punishment unless the state proves his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. We can‟t get more from the presumption of innocence, and a three-verdict
system doesn‟t run afoul of this essential precept.
The value of a more fully exculpatory acquittal is recognized by the State
of California, which has for three decades permitted an acquitted defendant to
petition the court for a declaration of factual innocence. 102 Now, California‟s
system is not well designed. For one thing, the burden imposed on the
defendant—to establish that “no reasonable cause exists to believe” that he
committed the charged offense—is far too demanding.103 Furthermore, because
the state does not provide counsel for pursuing a post-acquittal innocence petition,
and because few most criminal defendants have the personal resources to invest
on such a low-probability chance, few acquitted defendants even make the
attempt. 104 Nonetheless, the instinct is sound: there are innocent acquitted
defendants, and the benefit to them of being exonerated, not merely exculpated, is
immeasurable.
To say that it‟s immeasurable does not mean, moreover, that it is entirely
intangible. The police maintain arrest records even when the arrest results in the
dismissal of charges or an acquittal at trial. So a defendant acquitted by the
customary “not guilty” verdict is still more likely to be suspected and arrested for
a new offense that strikes the police as similar to the old one. And an arrest can
be grounds in some states for revocation of probation or parole even when it
results in acquittal so long as the officer at the revocation hearing believes that the
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probationer or parolee was probably guilty. Presumably, defendants acquitted as
“innocent” would be relieved of these burdens.105
2. Total convictions. So far we have supposed that the choice between the
two systems would have no effect on the conviction rate: a defendant destined for
conviction under the existing two-verdict system would be convicted under a
three-verdict system, and vice versa. But that is almost certainly incorrect. Some
number of defendants who are adjudged “guilty” under the two-verdict system
would be adjudged “not proven” under a three-verdict system.
This is admittedly counterintuitive. But the claim rests on a well
established psychological bias known as “the framing effect”—the phenomenon
in which two “logically equivalent (but not transparently equivalent) statements
of a problem lead decision makers to choose different options.”106 In a standard
example, physicians and public health officials evaluate some policy option—say,
a quarantine or compulsory vaccination—differently depending on whether they
are told the percentage of lives that the measure will save or the percentage of
expected deaths that it will fail to avoid, even when these amount to the same
thing.
One subtype of the framing effect is “the compromise effect,” the
tendency of people to evaluate a given option more favorably when it appears as
intermediate in a choice set rather than as an extreme. In one particularly relevant
set of experiments,107 a summary of facts concerning a homicide was presented to
two groups of subjects. Subjects in the first group were asked to decide whether
the defendant‟s actions satisfied the legal definition of manslaughter (punishable
by eight years imprisonment) or of murder (punishable up to life imprisonment
with the possibility of parole). Subjects in the second group were offered, in
addition, a third possibility of aggravated murder (punishable by death or life
imprisonment without possibility of parole).
Forty seven percent of the subjects in the first group (the two-option
group) chose manslaughter, while 53% chose murder. But for compromise
effects, we would expect that the percentage of subjects choosing manslaughter in
the second group (the three-option group) would remain about the same: as a
logical matter, if the defendant should be found guilty only of manslaughter when
the alternative is murder, he should still be convictable only of manslaughter
when an additional more extreme form of murder is put on the table. As it
happened, though, only 19% of the subjects in the second group chose
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manslaughter, the remaining 81% dividing about equally between murder and
aggravated murder. This is the compromise effect—also known as extremeness
aversion—in action: murder suddenly became a more attractive option just
because it became outflanked. Implications for a 3-verdict option are clear: some
juries that would have convicted a defendant when given a choice between two
“extremes” will acquit on the grounds of “not proven” when that is the
intermediate option. Three days before the Saints would meet the Colts in Super
Bowl XLIV, Freddie Peacock became the 250th person whose wrongful
conviction was set aside on the strength of exculpatory DNA evidence. 108
Possibly some number of those innocent men and women would not have been
convicted in the first place had their juries been given the option of a third verdict.
3. Scots on the rocks. In fact, the belief that the availability of a more
favorable acquittal affects the line between the less favorable acquittal and
conviction was at the root of Scottish disaffection with their three-verdict system
in the early 1990s when juries in three high-profile murder prosecutions returned
not-proven verdicts despite what most observers deemed evidence of guilt fully
adequate to support conviction—including, in one case, the defendant‟s teeth
marks on the victim‟s body.109 In the end, the reform was resisted, but without
much enthusiasm. Even Lord Advocate McCluskey, who defended the existing
system, acknowledged that one wouldn‟t sensibly incorporate two levels of
acquittal were one “starting from scratch.” 110 But, charmingly illustrating the
status quo bias, he opined that that was little reason to actually change things.
The Scots were probably right to suppose that eliminating their top-drawer
acquittal and switching to a two-verdict system would result in more convictions.
Yet the extent of their dissatisfaction with their existing criminal justice regime
has much more to do, not with a two-tiered acquittal system per se, but with the
simply nutty way they have implemented it. Judges instruct juries that there are
three verdicts, and that they may not return a verdict of guilty unless persuaded of
the defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But they don‟t instruct juries
regarding how to choose between a verdict of “not guilty” and one of “not
proven.” This is not a mere oversight. Inexplicably, it seems designed. In one
case, an appeals court specifically instructed trial judges not to explain the
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difference between the two verdicts.111 Jurors need not even be instructed that a
not proven verdict is a verdict of acquittal!112
That neither judges nor jurors have much idea what the verdicts mean is
evidenced by the shockingly high rate of not guilty acquittals. We have already
noted the reason to expect not proven acquittals to outpace not guilty acquittals:
criminal defendants are not randomly plucked from the population; in any
minimally decent system of criminal justice, guilty defendants will greatly
outnumber innocent ones. Remarkably, however, four-fifths of acquittals in
bench trials, and two-thirds of the acquittals in jury trials, are of the “not guilty”
variety.113 The Lord Advocate, then, was right: you surely wouldn‟t adopt the
Scottish three-verdict system were you starting from scratch. That doesn‟t mean,
though, that you shouldn‟t adopt a more defensible form of two-tiered acquittals.
In any event, and putting aside the defects of the Scots‟ peculiar take on a
two-acquittal system, I have agreed that more defendants are likely to be acquitted
even in a well-designed two-acquittal system than in a single-acquittal system. Of
course, whether that would be a good thing or a bad thing is debatable. But if we
really believe that it is far worse for an innocent person to be convicted than for a
guilty person to go free, and if we also believe that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard, when complied with, promotes the right balance between erroneous
convictions and erroneous acquittals, then we should be concerned by the
(unsurprising) experimental finding that jurors do not adhere to the standard.
Given all this, that a three-verdict system should marginally increase the number
of acquittals weighs more plausibly in its favor than against it.
C. Summary
The previous parts of this essay used concepts and analyses familiar from
the legal scholar‟s toolkit to destabilize widespread acceptance of the IVE
standard employed in the NFL and the NCAA. This Part has turned the tables,
seeking to demonstrate that practices in football provide reason to question the
two-verdict (or one-acquittal) system employed throughout Anglo-American
criminal law. To be sure, we haven‟t said nearly enough yet to justify confidence
that substantial reform of the two-verdict system would be desirable.114 I hope
only that we have said enough to take the question seriously.
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CONCLUSION
Many sports already use instant replay in limited contexts to review calls
made by on-field officials. Given recent and rapid improvements in instant replay
technology, and the prospect of more to come, its use is bound to grow. Of
course, a sports league or regulating body contemplating the use of instant replay
does not confront a binary question—to employ it or not—but must rather address
a large number of questions concerning system design. One prominent question
concerns the appropriate standard of review. On this issue, observers and sports
officials appear to be in widespread agreement: initial calls should be strongly
entrenched against reversal. The “indisputable visual evidence” (IVE) standard
used in American football is widely thought to be a successful model, suitable for
adaptation elsewhere.
The near-consensus in favor of highly deferential standards of review for
instant replay in sports is puzzling, however, for there is obvious reason to prefer
a more neutral standard. Very simply, the ostensible purpose for instituting
instant replay is to correct officiating mistakes and a less deferential standard
would almost certainly achieve that goal better given today‟s technology. That is
not enough to conclude that highly deferential standards are misguided all things
considered, for other considerations might well support such standards despite
their failure to minimize officiating errors. But it is very far from self-evident just
what those other considerations would be, and this essay has argued that the
reasons most commonly given for IVE in professional football—that a less
deferential standard that would do a better job of error-correction would create
excessive delay or undermine respect for the officials—are unpersuasive.
While criticizing the standard arguments for IVE, the essay has also
distilled from loose and telegraphic observations in the sparse existing literature
other potentially more promising routes toward an ultimately persuasive defense.
In a nutshell, the most promising argument for highly deferential review might
well depend upon the proposition that, once a call has been reviewed, a decision
to reverse what was initially correct is worse than a decision to uphold
(equivalently, a decision not to reverse) what was initially incorrect. Indeed, I
suspect that an implicit belief in the truth of this proposition motivates many
defenders of a highly deferential standard. As best I can tell, though, no good
arguments for this proposition have yet been developed. One important
contribution of this essay is to highlight this claim and to sketch a superficially
plausible path toward vindicating it—a path that invokes the entertainment value
of sports and likely depends upon claims that reversal and affirmance
differentially impact aggregate preference-satisfaction. An alternative route
toward IVE rests upon a distinction between different types of errors—what I
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have called “blunder-errors” and “mistake-errors”—married to a claim that,
insofar as a given sport should be interested in correcting errors, it should be
interested in correcting the former and not the latter.
As these last comments indicate, it is not this essay‟s aim to conclusively
resolve what is the optimal standard of review for the use of instant replay in the
NFL, let alone what is the optimal standard for sports generally. Serious and
careful thinking about the problem is at far too early a stage to make such an
ambition realistic. Rather, my goal has been to identify a largely ignored and
surprisingly challenging puzzle regarding the rules and practices of sports and to
start charting some paths toward its resolution. In so doing, I also hope to
demonstrate that legal scholars have much to teach, and much to learn, by taking
sports seriously—not as objects of regulation by law, but as legal systems in their
own right and thus as proper subjects for comparative and jurisprudential inquiry.

